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The security of an application’s data is an important consideration when creating
modern applications. Users requiring secure data access undergo an explicit preregistration process where an electronic identity (username, X.509 certificate, etc.) and a
method of laying claim to the identity (password, public/private key pair, etc.) are created.
The user’s authorization data is associated with the electronic identity. However, there are
emergent situations where a user needs to access data where previous pre-registration is
not possible because the future need for such data is unpredictable, such as an emergency
room physician accessing the electronic health records (EHRs) of admitted patients. A
process is needed where users (requestors such as medical personnel) make requests to the
resource providers (controllers such as EHRs) in such a way that trust can be established
automatically, allowing the requestor to obtain the necessary data quickly, securely, and
safely.
The high-level focus of this dissertation is to present a trust negotiation framework
that allows trust to be established with automated techniques by extending and combining
trust negotiation and a new trust profile. Trust negotiation establishes trust by allowing a
requestor and controller to alternate releasing secure credentials. The trust profile
introduced in this dissertation is a complete history of the user’s access to sensitive data.

Eugene Nicholas Sanzi, University of Connecticut, 2020
The user chooses a subset of the trust profile and presents it to the controller during trust
negotiation as proof that the user has been trusted to access sensitive data in the past. If the
controller grants access to the user, the controller generates new credentials that the user
receives and adds to the trust profile. The feasibility of this approach is demonstrated
through a scenario in the healthcare industry, where healthcare professionals (doctors,
nurses, insurance agents, public health officials, etc.) obtain authorization to healthcare
data possessed by healthcare organizations, with whom there is no pre-existing
relationship. We leverage health information exchange concepts, the Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standard, and the Connecticut Concussion Tracker app
as the infrastructure within which trust profiles and trust negotiation are realized.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern computer systems are responsible for protecting a wide variety of secure
data resources from malicious actors while also ensuring data availability to those who are
sanctioned to access the data. Traditionally, access to data is determined via a process
consisting of authentication, authorization, and registration. Authentication is the process
of determining the user’s identity. Authorization is the process assigning access rights (e.g.,
create or read a file) to the data. Registration refers to the process of generating the data
necessary to authenticate and authorize a user. The user’s identity consists of a username,
which forms the basis of the identity, and a secret password, which is utilized as a means
of claiming the identity. Creation of authorization data may be automated in simple cases,
as in the case where a user only has a need to access data they create (e.g., email). A more
complex case may require human intervention, such as a physician accessing electronic
healthcare records (EHRs) from the local hospital’s computer system. For this scheme to
work, the username, password, and authorization data must be previously known to the
computer system. The authentication process is simple and effective when it is known in
advance that a specific user will have a need to access secure data residing in a known
computer system. Conversely, the registration process is slow and inept when users may
unexpectedly have a need to quickly access data from a computer system to which he/she
has no previous existing relationship. To address this issue, trust negotiation
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(Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) provides a method for a set of user credentials to
be released over an automated negotiation period.
Further complicating the processes of authentication, authorization and registration
in a domain such as healthcare is the need to support health information exchange (HIE)
so that medical providers treating patients can securely access multiple health information
technology (HIT) systems (e.g., electronic health records (EHRs) patient portals, eprescribing applications for medical providers and pharmacists, laboratory diagnostic
systems, etc.) in both emergency and non-emergency situations to treat patients. This might
include HIT systems to which the medical provider has not been given access previously.
The increased interest in the secure sharing of data requires that methods for authenticating
and authorizing users must become more sophisticated in order to support the needs of both
the users and interactions with multiple HIT systems in the domain. The trust negotiation
method outlined in this dissertation allows each HIT system (e.g., an EHR) to create and
maintain its own criteria for data dissemination to users without the need for a central login
system or pre-registration process. To support the trust negotiation process, each
participating HIT system (for the user or the data source), must have a controller capability
separate from that system in order to facilitate the interactions when the user without
credentials requests access to one or more HIT systems they have not been authorized to
use. The user in this case holds a record of each access to sensitive data, where each record
is added to a collection that is referred to as a trust profile. This trust profile for a user
contains records of access that have been accrued over time from multiple HIT systems
that the user has been authorized to access. On the HIT system side of the trust negotiation
process, the controller receives the trust profile from the user and is responsible for
2

interacting with the HIT system to decide if the requested access is allowable. When trust
negotiation is successful, the controller creates a new entry in the trust profile for the user
that can be utilized in future attempts to access sensitive data with any controller. Our
proposed trust negotiation approach that is presented in this dissertation is integrated into
the security model provided by the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)
(HL7 International, 2020) standard, a health information exchange (HIE) standard created
by HL7 to promote secure sharing of healthcare data among multiple health information
technology (HIT) systems. Figure 1.1 illustrates the components needed to attain quick,
automated trust negotiation for the release of secure data to a legitimate user. The leftmost
side of Figure 1.1 indicates the components utilized by the user to obtain trust, whereas the
rightmost side indicates the server-side components that check user credentials for validity,
determine the level of access the user will obtain if any, and securely transfer the data to
the user. Note that the user can be any medical stakeholder such as a physician, nurse,
pharmacist, etc. While the examples in this dissertation are heavily dominated using the
healthcare domain, the trust profile research that is presented as captured in the orange and
blue boxes at the bottom of Figure 1.1 can be applied to any domain that is interested in
tracking the history of users who are accessing highly sensitive data.

3

Figure 1.1. Interactions and Flow of Proposed Trust Negotiation Framework.
To understand all of the different interactions of trust negotiation, we explain all of
the different components in Figure 1.1. This includes:



The uppermost left corner a Figure 1.1 introduces the concept of a Medical
Authority, which is an entity that promotes trust among the various HIT systems
participating in trust negotiation, allowing them to trust each other’s endorsements
of a user’s Trust Profile. The Medical Authority plays a major role in overseeing
the process in interactions of all of the different components in trust negotiation.



The upper left corner of Figure 1.1 has HIT Systems that the user has accessed data
from that are accessible via a Medical Authority that front-ends a health
information exchange layer that uses HAPI FHIR. These HIT systems endorse the
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user by digitally signing the certificates that indicate the user has obtained access
to the data listed in the Trust Profile.



The Trust Profile in the lower left corner of Figure 1.1, represents a collection of
the user’s history of access to sensitive data, and includes: the User’s Trust Agent,
an autonomous actor that manages disclosure of the user’s Trust Profile during the
trust negotiation process; the Identity and Attribute certificates that encode the
user’s Trust Profile and add legitimacy to the Trust Profile by allowing the data to
be verified and endorsed by a third party (a participating HIT System); and, a
Digital Wallet, a subset of the user’s Trust Profile that the user chooses to send with
the request for sensitive data. The Digital Wallet is compiled by the user as an
example of the user accessing similar sensitive data in the past.



The Controller’s Trust Agent in the lower right corner of Figure 1.1, is an
autonomous actor that manages the disclosure of the controller’s credentials and
requests credentials from the user. The controller’s Trust Negotiation component
determines the type of credentials from the Trust Profile required to access the
requested data, using Access Control Policies.



The upper right corner of Figure 1.1 represents the health records that are available
from the Medical Authority from one of the HIT Systems. Access to the health
records/FHIR resources are via access control policies such as role-based access
control, RBAC (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), attribute
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based access control ABAC (Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory based access control
MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976).

Collectively, all of these components and their interactions provide the necessary
infrastructure to allow controllers to generate requirements for the secure dissemination of
sensitive data, request credentials from a user’s Trust Profile, match those credentials to
access control policies, transfer the requested data to the user, and generate new credentials
for the user.

1.1.

Motivation for Healthcare
The healthcare industry is increasingly interested in sharing healthcare data among

medical providers (e.g., hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, public health officials, etc.) via HIE
to enhance treatment and increase patient satisfaction (HealthIT.gov, 2014) (Kelly, 2013)
(Mettler & Rohner, 2009). The healthcare industry is moving towards an approach to
treatment where the patient sees a number of specialists in disparate subfields (e.g., general
practitioners, cardiologists, oncologists, surgeons, dentists, psychiatrists, etc.) to treat a
single patient. These healthcare professionals may not necessarily interact or know each
other, but each must have complete access to the patient’s healthcare record to form
effective treatments. Healthcare workers in emergent care such as ER physicians or EMTs
have a vested interest in obtaining patient data quickly, even if the patient’s EHR data is
located at multiple facilities. The availability of patient information across multiple HIT
systems requires a Medical Authority that front ends a health information exchange layer
supported by a standard such as FHIR as shown in Figure 1.1. The username/password
6

combination is insufficient in these scenarios as the preregistration process places too much
of a burden on system administrators, requires the compilation of identity-based credentials
from the physicians, and requires a lengthy vetting process. While a single, monolithic
login platform with participation from all healthcare facilities would be sufficient in
avoiding the drawbacks caused by the preregistration process, it creates a single point of
failure, creates an extremely visible target for criminals, and diminishes the ability of
controllers to control the dissemination of the Protected Health Information (PHI) they are
charged with protecting under laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2019).
Our trust profile based trust negotiation approach allows controllers (e.g., hospitals,
health record banks, etc.) to automate the approval of the release of patient data by allowing
them the flexibility to define the criteria that must be met before the data is released.
Stakeholders such as physicians, hospitals, insurance companies, or public health officials
are allowed to build trust amongst themselves through interactions over the course of a
professional career. Users with a high amount of trust will find it relatively easy to request
secure data, while users with a lower amount of trust may be required by controllers to
meet stricter requirements to ensure that patient data is not leaked. The combination of
expandable trust profiles with trust negotiation allows increased granularity in the
credentials a user may present during the negotiation process, thus also increasing the
granularity of the controller’s security measures.
The increasing presence of mobile devices within the healthcare field provides
additional difficulties as these devices may be lost or stolen, resulting in the exposure of
sensitive patient data (Cisco, 2020). According to the Identity Theft Resource Center, a
7

non-profit organization that assists victims of identity theft, in 2019 the healthcare sector
was found to have had the second most data breaches at 525 (Identity Theft Resource
Center, 2020). An estimated 80% of physicians (Lewis, 2011) rely on mobile devices to
access patient information from EHRs. Trust negotiation provides an extra layer of security
by ensuring that the mobile device’s user is deserving of trust. An adaptation of trust
negotiation for mobile devices in the healthcare field was introduced in (Vawdrey,
Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson, 2003), which details a system for trust negotiation in
healthcare while incorporating surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003), which
addresses limited battery, slow computation, and unreliable networking issues in adapting
trust negotiation to mobile devices. The possibility of patient Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) and PHI being obtained via a stolen mobile device requires additional
security parameters to ensure that patient data is not leaked. Trust negotiation has the
potential to alleviate this concern by placing an insurmountable hurdle towards potential
criminals; since they have not obtained a healthcare focused trust profile, it is impossible
for them to obtain patient data from remote hospitals even with a stolen mobile healthcare
device.

1.2.

Motivation for Trust Profiling and Trust Negotiation
Many modern healthcare and financial industries are heavily data-driven and

depend on the availability of critical data while also being extremely sensitive to improper
data disclosure. In addition, there is a need for organizations operating within these fields
to share data with others under certain conditions. Modern healthcare in particular requires
teams of medical and non-medical professionals to treat a single patient, and each
healthcare provider must have access to a patient’s complete health record to form effective
8

treatments. Authorization data in both the healthcare and financial fields is often assigned
manually in a slow registration process that guarantees that the data is released to the proper
parties, but at the expense of time and the cost of needing an employee to manually perform
the authorization. Authorizing individuals from other companies or fields may take even
longer, as the identity and trustworthiness of the individual must be ascertained by the
authorizer, which may slow down the process considerably.
The concepts of trust profiling and trust negotiation have the potential to greatly
increase the speed at which authorization occurs while also properly restricting access only
to those who should have access to the data by automating the assignment of permissions
on the data, even to those who have no previous relationship with the data holder.
Additionally, traditional authorization is often only able to produce an allow/deny decision,
where the user may only be authorized to access all the data or none of it, despite the release
of some forms of data (e.g., patient demographic information) being far less controlled and
potentially damaging than others (e.g., patient mental health data). More nuanced forms of
authorization, such as those outlined in this dissertation, allow for annotation on many
different types of data and also allow the user to retrieve requested data to which they are
authorized, while filtering more restricted data. Our approach also allows for the controller
to automatically determine whether data must be added (e.g., including a required library
so the requested data can be read), modified (e.g., translating an internal data representation
into a data interchange standard), or removed (e.g., removing mental health data from a
patient’s EHR before transfer).
In support of these needs, our proposed trust negotiation approach seeks to allow
for the integration of trust negotiation (Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) and trust
9

profiles (Sanzi, Demurjian, Agresta, & Murphy, November 2016) with role-based access
control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), attribute-based
access control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell &
La Padula, 1976). These three access control models allow us to leverage the trust
negotiation procedure in a manner that allows for the automation of the assignment of
permissions on data to the user and streamlines the negotiation of the release of portions of
the user’s Trust Profile in the form of a Digital Wallet as shown in the bottom of Figure
1.1. This Digital Wallet shown in the bottom center contains access history records that
detail the Trust Profile owner’s previous access to secured data. Portions of this data may
be taken as credentials in the trust negotiation process that detail properties of the data
accessed, such as the type of data access (e.g., patient drug list, financial report, etc.) or the
identity of the patient listed in the record. When a controller receives a request for data in
the bottom of Figure 1.1, the user’s role in an RBAC scheme is sent along with the request
so that the controller can ascertain the user’s reason for requesting the data. For instance, a
physician role in the healthcare field would be expected to access individual healthcare
records, whereas a public health official would be expected to access more general data
across many patients with regards to trends in public health (e.g., tracking concussions
among high school athletes). ABAC, shown in the Access Control Policies in the centerright of Figure 1.1, allows the integration of credentials in the form of attributes from the
Trust Profile to assist in determining whether the user has an access history that indicates
experience and trustworthiness in handling the requested data, while also integrating MAC
Access Control Policies to assign a security clearance level to the data.
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The Trust Profile also enhances the security and efficiency of mobile devices by
providing a scheme through which the user of the device can prove that the current user is
authorized to access data. Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular as a
computing platform (Gartner, March 19, 2015), yet with increased popularity comes an
increased focus on device security as more criminals consider mobile devices to be a prime
target for data theft (Montopoli, 2013). Lost or stolen devices have the potential to allow
criminals the opportunity to access sensitive data if proper security safeguards are not
utilized. Stolen mobile devices may contain many types of sensitive data including:
banking information, personally identifiable information (PII), protected health
information (PHI), or allow the criminal the opportunity to access business or healthcare
services. The addition of trust profiling and trust negotiation inserts an extra layer of
security that allows any servers the device connects to the opportunity to determine that
the current holder is a legitimate user by checking the user’s access history.

1.3.

A High-Level View of Our Approach
This dissertation seeks to create a method by which two entities whose identities

are completely unknown to each other may initiate and fulfill requests for access to secure
data or resources as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 illustrates six levels through which
the trust negotiation process is realized, from the local EHRs at the top of Figure 1.2
enhancing the level of trust for the user to remote HITs at the bottom of Figure 1.2 that
users request sensitive PHI. The six levels are: Local EHR, User Devices, Trust Building,
Trust Negotiation, Security Policies, and FHIR Resources from Remote HITs. There is a
correspondence between the material presented in Figure 1.1 and the levels as given in
Figure 1.2. Specifically, the orange and blue boxes at the bottom of Figure 1.1 correspond
11

to the Trust Building and Trust Negotiation levels in Figure 1.2 and these two levels are
independent of the healthcare domain and could be leveraged and other domains that are
interested in the secure access to information in a trusted manner. The User Devices present
in the second level in Figure 1.2 allow healthcare professionals access to the Trust Building
tools present in the Trust Building level, as well as offering connections to local EHRs and
the ability to view sensitive PHI once authorized. The Medical Authority promotes trust
among the healthcare organizations (HCOs), while the HCOs promote trust in an individual
user’s Trust Profile, allowing the user’s access to trusted credentials. The Trust Building
tools allow the User Devices to participate in Trust Negotiation where a user exchanges
the credentials available from the Trust Building level to negotiate the release of a patient’s
healthcare data. The Trust Negotiation level encompasses the Credential Exchange,
verification of the certificates through the trust building process (Profile Verification), and
Release Actions performed if trust negotiation is successful, such as logging the
transaction. The Security Policies level represents the security protocols that inform which
credentials must be presented from the Trust Negotiation level to gain access to healthcare
data provided by FHIR. The Security Policies filter the data provided by the FHIR
Resources from Remote HITs illustrated in the bottom level in Figure 1.2 to ensure safe,
secure sharing of sensitive healthcare data.
Access requests are facilitated through the Trust Negotiation level in a gradual
exchange of increasingly sensitive credentials on the part of both the requestor and the
controller until a mutual trust is established that: the requestor is qualified to access the
requested resource, the requestor will handle sensitive resources in an appropriate manner,
and the controller can be expected to provide the resource requested; or it is determined
12

that mutual trust cannot be established and the request fails. The credentials include a trust
profile, a series of access records that encompasses the requestor’s complete history of
sensitive resource access including: when the request was made, the role the requestor held
when the request was made, the requestor’s affiliation status with healthcare providers, the
resource requested, the controller the resource was requested from, the confidentiality of
the resource, and the highest sensitivity level granted to the requestor from the controller.
The Trust Profile is displayed in the lower left corner of Figure 1.1. During trust
negotiation, the user’s Trust Profile is gradually exchanged with the controller through the
Digital Wallet, represented by the arrows flowing from the User Trust Agent to the
Controller Trust Agent. The controller responds to a request for access to a resource from
a user by using its Access Control Policies to determine the access history the user will
need to provide through a subset of the Trust Profile to obtain access to the requested
resource. The controller is illustrated in Figure 1.1 in the box encompassing the right side.
The controller may also decide to take additional release actions depending on how well
the requestor’s presented trust profile fulfill its criteria. The controller may decide to: redact
sensitive data, add data for interpretive purposes, modify data to arrange it into the correct
format, or perform other functions such as dispatching audit notifications. Our approach
allows each controller to determine its own Access Control Policies, giving the healthcare
organization full control over its data disclosure requirements. The user also has full control
over sensitive credentials released during the trust negotiation process and may choose to
withhold sensitive trust profile entries until receiving additional assurances from the
controller.
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The trust profile is encoded in a series of X.509 Identity and Attribute Certificates
(Housley, Polk, Ford, & Solo, 2002). These certificates are permanent representations of
the user’s access control history and are available to the user throughout his/her entire
career. Should the user change employment, any certificates indicating current affiliation
with the previous employer are revoked, but the history of sensitive record access may still
be presented during trust negotiation. Each user possesses one Identity Certificate per
controller from whom sensitive resource access has been granted. Each Identity Certificate
may have one or more Attribute Certificates attached to it detailing the sensitive data that
has been obtained. The Identity Certificates provide controllers with a verifiable method
of determining that it has been presented by the owner of the trust profile by verifying
ownership of the private key associated with the public key listed in the certificate.
Attribute Certificates are attached to the Identity Certificates by verifying that the serial
number and the issuer match the fields listed in the Identity Certificate. The digital
signatures on the certificates, provided by the controller that granted access to the user,
provide assurance that the information contained within the certificate is correct and has
not been altered since the certificate was signed. The Trust Profile certificates may be held
by the user in a local certificate store or stored with a Trust Agent that performs the trust
negotiation process on the user’s behalf.

14

Figure 1.2. High-Level View of Trust Profile Supported Trust Negotiation.
The Medical Authority establishes trust between the healthcare organizations
(HCOs) that own the HIT Systems by signing their controllers’ Certificate Authority
certificates, allowing the HIT Systems to sign the Trust Profile certificates as displayed in
the Trust Building level of Figure 1.2. Medical Authorities are analogous to root certificate
authorities – they promote trust among HCOs by acting as a mutually trusted third party,
15

symbolized by the arrow connecting medical authorities to HCOs in Figure 1.2. While
certificate authorities are generally limited to providing assurance that the user has
connected to the correct domain or verifying the domain owner’s legal identity, the Medical
Authority is responsible for also providing assurance that HCOs that can create trust profile
entries are: producing accurate records, protecting their private keys appropriately, and
enforcing a minimum standard on data disclosure. Each controller for an HCO must
maintain a store of certificates belonging to medical authorities whose judgement is trusted
by the administrator. During the inspection of certificates that represent entries in the
requestor’s Trust Profile, the digital signature on the certificates is inspected to ensure that
the data within the certificate has not been altered. Then the certificate of the signer is
inspected in the same manner. In most cases, this certificate will be a certificate belonging
to another controller that the requestor has previously gained sensitive access to, with an
entry indicating that the other controller has been authorized by a Medical Authority to
produce Trust Profile certificates for its domain, and the Medical Authority’s digital
signature. If this certificate is valid, the certificate of the Medical Authority is retrieved and
is checked against the controller’s certificate store: if a matching certificate is found the
trust profile certificates are valid. This establishes a chain of trust depicted in the Trust
Building level of Figure 1.2. The Medical Authority establishes trust among HCOs, while
the HCOs establish trust in each user’s trust profile through a chain of digital signatures.
The system administrators can specify a series of requirements of the user’s history
that prove a need to access the data, responsibility in handling similar data, and allow
access to secure data by applying RBAC, ABAC, MAC, etc., with a granularity
encompassing health records, groups of health record data (demographic, insurance related,
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etc.), and individual entries (a single MRI scan). This functionality is represented by the
Security Policies of Figure 1.2. For instance, an administrator can indicate that general
patient demographic information is available to requestors possessing the nurse or
physician roles from other hospitals if they are able to present a credential indicating that
they are presently employed by a healthcare organization recognized by a Medical
Authority and have accessed healthcare data annotated with the lowest security level.
Conversely, for more sensitive information such as a patient’s complete EHR, the
administrator can specify that: the requestor needs Trust Profile entries indicating that the
requestor has accessed the same patient’s healthcare record from other organizations and
the controller must report the access for review by an auditor. This additional flexibility
allows for the sharing of potentially sensitive healthcare data with healthcare professionals
that have a need to access sensitive healthcare data who have proven to be trustworthy in
the past, freeing administrators from a time-consuming manual vetting of a requestor’s
trustworthiness and allowing the release of healthcare data immediately in time-critical
situations.

1.4.

Research Objectives and Expected Contributions
The proposed solution for integrating trust negotiation and trust profiling has the

following expected contributions.
A.

Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations

Participating in Trust Negotiation: This contribution will define a set of infrastructure
requirements that organizations must provide to support the ability to establish implicit
trust in the credentials generated and signed by one another and to enforce the trust
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negotiation process, represented by the Trust Building process of Figure 1.2. This trust
between organizations forms the basis of the Trust Profile, as the organizations must be
sure that the presented credentials in the Trust Profile are valid to make an informed
decision as to the trustworthiness of the requestor. The left side of Figure 1.1 represents
the trust building network and encompasses the Medial Authority for HIE via HAPI FHIR,
each HIT system, HIE via HAPI FHIR, and the Trust Profile’s Identity and Attribute
Certificates.
B.

Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording Complete Records of User

Access to Sensitive Data: The contribution will include a format for the Trust Profile that
provides the ability to record metadata describing sensitive data access and built in integrity
checks during the Trust Negotiation level of Figure 1.2, allowing for the Trust Profile to
be utilized as a credential with minimal communication required between participating
organizations. These interactions occur between controllers and requestors. The model
includes granular access control annotation of healthcare data stored in a HAPI FHIR
server and the methods utilized to match trust profile access history data to the annotated
FHIR data. This contribution provides the internal structure for the Identity and Attribute
Certificates depicted on the left of Figure 1.1 and the process of exchanging Trust Profile
credentials between the User Trust Agent and the Controller Trust Agent.
C.

Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies: This contribution is

a combination of access control models RBAC, ABAC, and MAC that provide a method
for organizations to utilize a set of security policies that can be dynamically adapted to the
current request, located in the Security Policies level of Figure 1.2. Requirements for the
release of data depend on: the role the requestor assumes during the negotiation, the type
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of healthcare data requested, the portions of the Trust Profile released during negotiation,
and the security annotations attached to the data resources. This contribution forms the
structure and interactions between the Access Control Policies on the right side of Figure
1.1.
D.

Trust Negotiation Development Framework:

Contribution D provides the

participating organization with all of the required steps and processes that are necessary to:
define the infrastructure in support of Contribution A; support and implement the model
for Contribution B; and, enforce a dynamic adaptive trust negotiation process in support of
Contribution C. This contribution defines the interactions between the various components
in a full, trust negotiation capable HIT system depicted on the right side of Figure 1.1.
Contribution D provides the necessary links between the Trust Negotiation, Security
Policies, and FHIR Resources from Remote HITs level in Figure 1.2.
This dissertation will examine each contribution’s relevance towards trust profiles and trust
negotiation in the healthcare field.

1.5.

Research Progress to Date
In support of the proposed trust profile based trust negotiation, we summarize our

4 publications (4 published) and their contribution toward the dissertation: lead author
directly related to the work are: 2 published refereed book chapters and 2 published
refereed full conference articles; coauthor of 2 published journal articles; coauthor of 1
published refereed book chapter; and coauthor of 1 published refereed full conference
article. The first papers focused on the overall concept and flow of a trust profile based
trust negotiation process, as well as a network structure for disseminating trust throughout
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the healthcare network (Sanzi & Demurjian, Identification and Adaptive Trust Negotiation
in Interconnected Systems, May 2016). This work was expanded with a method of adapting
trust profiles and trust negotiation to mobile devices including: description of the contents
and set of interactions for trust profiles stored on mobile devices during trust negotiation;
and detailed descriptions of the exchange of credentials between the user’s mobile device,
trust agents, and the controller; and the generation and storage of new trust profile
credentials if the trust negotiation is successful (Sanzi, Demurjian, Agresta, & Murphy,
November 2016).


Sanzi, E. and S. Demurjian, "Identification and Adaptive Trust Negotiation in
Interconnected Systems," in Innovative Solutions for Access Control Management,
A. Malik, A. Anjum and B. Raza, Eds., IGI Global, May 2016, pp. 33-65.



Sanzi, E., S. Demurjian, T. Agresta and A. Murphy, "Trust Profiling to Enable
Adaptive Trust Negotiation in Mobile Devices," in Mobile Application
Development, Usability, and Security, S. Mukherja, Ed., IGI Global, November
2016, pp. 95-116.

Building upon these trust building concepts, we defined a formal model for the trust profile
(Sanzi, Demurjian, & Billings, Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust Negotiation, and Attribute
Based Access Control, 2017). This formal model provides a standardized structure for the
trust profile, including a set of standardized attribute certificate structures to describe each
access to sensitive healthcare data and a set of attribute certificates describing overall
sensitivity levels and local affiliation with a healthcare organization as a whole.


Sanzi, E., Demurjian, S., & Billings, J. (2017). Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust
Negotiation, and Attribute Based Access Control. 2017 5th IEEE International
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The next effort provides a methodology for incorporating trust profile based trust
negotiation into the FHIR standard by providing a standard set of security objects. These
security objects are generated based on a configuration set by a system administrator, as
well as the patient described by the resource the security objects belong to, and adapts the
security objects based on the user’s role and the credentials chosen from the trust profile
by the user during trust negotiation.


Sanzi, E. and Demurjian, S., “Trust Profile Based Trust Negotiation for the FHIR
Standard,” Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Data Science,
Technologies, and Applications (DATA2020), July 2020.

Other publications not directly related to the work are:


Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M. and Agresta, T., “An
Architectural Solution for Health Information Exchange,” republished in Virtual
and Mobile Healthcare: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice, Information
Resources Management Association (USA), pp. 283-327, July 2020.



Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Agresta, T., and Yasnoff, W., “Multi-Level Security in
Healthcare using a Lattice-Based Access Control Model,” IGI International
Journal of Privacy and Health Information Management (IJPHIM), Vol. 7, No. 1,
January-June 2019, pp. 80-102, IGI Global,



Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M. and Agresta, T., “An
Architectural Solution for Health Information Exchange,” International Journal of
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User-Driven Healthcare (IJUDH), Vol 6, No. 1, pp. 65-103, November 2016, IGI
Global,

https://www.igi-global.com/article/an-architectural-solution-for-health-

information-exchange/181318


Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Sanzi, E., & Agresta, T. (2016). Toward
Integrating Healthcare Data and Systems: A Study of Architectural Alternatives. In
T. Iyamu, & A. Tatnall (Eds.), Maximizing Healthcare Delivery and Management
through Technology Integration, pp. 270-304. IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-14666-9446-0.ch016



Agresta, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., DeStefano, J., Ward-Charlerie, S., Rusnak,
R., & Tran, R. (2020). A Mobile Health Application for Medication Reconciliation
using RxNorm and FHIR. Submitted to The Fifth International Conference on
Informatics and Assistive Technologies for Health-Care, Medical Support and
Wellbeing (HEALTHINFO 2020). Porto, Portugal.

1.6.

Dissertation Outline
The remainder of the dissertation has 6 chapters. In Chapter 2, we detail background

on the requirements for security in the healthcare field, relevant RBAC, ABAC, and MAC
access control models utilized to restrict information access, supporting technologies for
trust negotiation, and the FHIR standard/HAPI server implementation for supporting the
trust profile infrastructure. Chapter 2 also briefly presents the Connecticut Concussion
Tracker (CT2) app that was created as the result of a new law passed in Connecticut
(Connecticut General Assembly, 2015) requiring that concussions be tracked for kids
between the ages of 7 to age 19 in public schools. In Chapter 3, we address: Contribution
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A: Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations Participating in
Trust Negotiation, which establishes how healthcare organizations and their affiliates
connect on the network, establish communication protocols, and create a baseline of trust
in the credentials themselves; Contribution B: Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording
Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data by detailing the identity and attribute
certificates that form the trust profile; and, Contribution C: Dynamically Generated
Adaptive Access Control Policies by defining integration of access control policies into
attribute certificates. In Chapter 4, we primarily address Contribution B: Trust Profile for
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data by describing the
interactions between the requestor and the data controller that allows a gradual growth in
trust to occur. Chapter 4 also addresses Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive
Access Control Policies, by describing how the access control policies protect the
underlying healthcare data and establishes the relationship between the access control
policies and the trust establishment process through a defined formal model. Contribution
C is illustrated utilizing a mobile health (mHealth) application for concussion management
which leverages health information exchange concepts and a RESTful API as the
infrastructure within which are trust profiles and trust negotiation are realized. In Chapter
5, we address Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies
by defining integration of access control policies with the controller and Contribution D:
Adaptive Trust Design and Development Methodology by providing a framework for
integrating dynamic and adaptive trust negotiation to existing healthcare services. Chapter
6 addresses Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies
with a detailed description of a controller implementation that utilizes the access control
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policies to guard access to the CT2 app prototype and Contribution D: Trust Negotiation
Development Framework by including a detailed discussion of the prototype (CT 2) that has
been developed to demonstrate unification of the trust profile concepts presented
throughout this dissertation. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the contributions in
the dissertation and a detailed discussion of potential future research directions and efforts.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes background information necessary for the main
contributions and supporting concepts utilized throughout the remainder of this
dissertation. Section 2.1 has a brief overview of the state of trust and interoperability
between healthcare systems and the standards that must be met to enable secure
interoperability. Section 2.2 explains role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo,
Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), attribute-based access control (ABAC)
(Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976) and their
application to healthcare security. Section 2.3 provides a detailed explanation of the FHIR
(HL7 International, 2020) standard and the HAPI server (HAPI FHIR, 2020) in support of
the trust negotiation model. Section 2.4 concludes the background with a description of the
Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) mobile app, a collaboration between the
Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at
the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine. The CT 2 app was
created in support of a new Connecticut law passed to track concussions among students
for grades kindergarten through high school (Connecticut General Assembly, 2015). The
application will be utilized in Chapter 6 in order to incorporate the trust profile concepts of
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 into a prototype in order to demonstrate how the entire trust profiling
process works.

2.1.

State of Trust and Interoperability
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Modern healthcare treatment requires a large amount of data to function efficiently
and effectively. A patient’s healthcare record includes important data compiled through the
use of various tests that are highly specialized and expensive, uncomfortable for the patient,
and sometimes result in long waiting periods before the results of the test are available.
Such tests may include: blood and tissue laboratory tests, X-Rays, EKGs, mammograms,
MRI scans, etc. Increased specialization in the healthcare field has created a need for
patients to travel between multiple healthcare providers, each performing one portion of
the patient’s treatment. Interoperability between the healthcare systems that the providers
utilize to compile and store patients’ healthcare records reduces stress to the patient and
increases efficiency by allowing these teams of specialists to be informed of the patient’s
current condition, treatments performed by other specialists, and patient history that may
inform current treatment. However, the current state of trust and interoperability within the
healthcare field has created barriers to this process including incompatible electronic health
record (EHR) formats and a lack of universal authentication and authorization methods.
The creation of the meaningful use guidelines (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2018) has incentivized many EHR software packages such as OpenEMR
(OpenEMR, 2020), Epic (Epic Systems Corporation, 2020), and WorldVistA
(WorldVistA, 2020) to create new interoperability software. Although there has been
improvements, these software solutions often still suffer from issues that limit their overall
effectiveness. For example Epic’s Care Everywhere (Yale New Haven Health; Yale
Medical Group, 2020) creates an electronic exchange among healthcare providers but only
operates between Epic’s own EHR installations, specifically the different medical practices
and office is associated with Yale New Haven health. One barrier to the adoption of
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interoperability standards is the lack of a universally adopted standard for health
information exchange (HIE). Health Level Seven International (HL7 International, 2019)
(HL7) is an organization created to rectify this by creating and promoting standards for
EHR interoperability. HL7’s latest standard, Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources
(FHIR) (HL7 International, 2020) is quickly being adopted by EHRs to facilitate
interoperability standards for the exchange of healthcare records. OpenEMR currently has
in-progress work on FHIR integration, but the full implementation is not yet available.
Although interoperability among healthcare providers is an ongoing goal, there is
yet to emerge a universal standard for healthcare authentication and authorization.
Traditionally, authentication and authorization is performed manually by an employee by
vetting the requestor’s identity and assigning them a set of permissions on the requested
data. One potential standard, OAuth2 (Hardt, 2012), is being utilized by large companies
such as Facebook (Facebook, 2020), Google (Google, 2020), and Twitter (Twitter, Inc.,
2020). OAuth2 has the potential to be both a universal authenticator and authorizer by
offloading the authentication/authorization processes to a third party during a request, then
sending authentication/authorization data back to the controller. However, OAuth suffers
from some weaknesses. Although OAuth does have widespread adoption and strong
industry support, it still requires that the user has been pre-registered before a request can
be authenticated and only offloads the authentication process to a trusted third party. The
adoption of a trust negotiation approach eliminates this weakness by allowing for trust to
be negotiated at request time without needing any prior details and without requiring an
identity to authenticate to.

2.2.

Access Control
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Role-based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, &
Chandramou, 2001) is an access control model that organizes permissions (read, write,
execute, etc.) into collections referred to as roles. Each user in the access control model is
assigned one or more roles and each role assigned to the user entitles him/her to the
associated permissions. When the user requests access to an object protected under RBAC,
the user chooses a role they have been previously assigned and the permissions associated
with the role are matched against the requested object. If the role the user has chosen has
sufficient permissions to access the object, the user obtains access; otherwise the user is
denied access. RBAC is a popular access control model in the healthcare field due to its
model matching the methods typically utilized to decide whether a healthcare
organization’s employee may access healthcare data (Fernández-Alemán, Señor, Lozoya,
& Toval, 2013) (Alhaqbani & C., 2008). Common roles include: physicians, nurses, billing,
administration, or receptionists. Data protected by RBAC in a healthcare setting includes:
demographic data, blood pressure readings, X-Rays, appointment times, ICD10 codes,
insurance information, etc. During treatment, a physician role may be assigned permissions
to access the entirety of the patient’s health record including demographics, treatment
history, and tests, but would be denied access to sensitive records such as the patient’s
mental healthcare data. Likewise, the billing department’s roles would not have access to
the patient’s full health record, but would have access to the patient’s insurance info,
ICD10 codes, and any other data required to properly bill the patient or the insurance
company.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976) is constructed
utilizing the concept of tagging information with a sensitivity level that represents
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confidentiality of the data by defining different categories of information. Subjects under
MAC are assigned a sensitivity level (clearance) based on the level of trust obtained.
Likewise, objects protected by MAC are also assigned a sensitivity level (classification)
based on their sensitivity. MAC’s sensitivity model generally is comprised of four
sensitivity levels: top secret (TS) > secret (S) > classified (C) > unclassified (U). In most
MAC schemes, a user is permitted to read data that has been classified at or below the
user’s assigned clearance. A user is permitted to write data which is then classified at or
above the user’s assigned clearance to prevent sensitive data from leaking downwards. In
the healthcare industry, a MAC model can be utilized to assign sensitivity levels to data,
allowing for more granular permissions on healthcare data that may be more sensitive. A
patient’s demographic information may be classified as U, since the patient’s name, phone
number, and contact information may be considered low risk, allowing any user with a U
clearance to request patient demographic information. However, a patient’s drug list may
be classified as S. Since a drug list may reveal a patient’s conditions, it is considered more
sensitive information. In this case, a user must have at least an S clearance to view the
patient’s drug list. The HL7 vocabulary (HL7 International, 2013) defines sensitivity levels
summarized in Table 2.1 of low, moderate, normal, restricted, unrestricted and very
restricted, depending on the perceived damage if the healthcare data was leaked. Note that
we have published an article (Demurjian, Sanzi, Agresta, & Yasnoff, January-June 2019)
on security of healthcare data utilizing lattice-based access control which is the parent of
MAC.
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unrestricted

This indicates that the information is not classified as
sensitive such as publicly available information, e.g.,
business name, phone, email or physical address.

L

low

The information requires protection to maintain low
sensitivity such as anonymized, pseudonymized, or
non-PII such as HIPAA limited data

M

moderate

This is moderately sensitive information, w hich
presents moderate risk of harm if disclosed w ithout
authorization.

N

normal

Non-stigmatizing health information, w hich presents
typical risk of harm if disclosed w ithout authorization.

R

restricted

Highly sensitive, for normal clinical care, potentially
stigmatizing information with a high risk if disclosed
w ithout authorization.

V

very
restricted

Extremely sensitive and likely stigmatizing health
information that presents a very high risk if disclosed
w ithout authorization.

U

Table 2.1. HL7 Confidentiality Levels.
Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014) is an access control
model where access to an object is dependent upon: a user’s attributes, the object’s
attributes, and a policy engine that can match the involved attributes, a set of rules, and
external environmental conditions. The user possesses a set of attributes that describe the
user, such as: licensing, roles, patient lists, or work schedule. The objects possess their own
set of attributes such as: patient ID, primary physician, or last editor. The policy engine
contains a list of programmed access control rules it incorporates into its decision making
process. During a user request for access, the policy engine reads the user attributes, the
object’s attributes, other environmental conditions such as the current time, and the access
control rules. Using the access control rules, the policy engine attempts to match the user’s
attributes, the object’s attributes, and the environmental conditions in a manner that
satisfies the access control rules. If this is successful, the user is granted the requested
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access to the object. The policy engine consists of the policy decision point (PDP) and the
policy enforcement point (PEP). The PDP is responsible for making a decision as to
whether the access control rules are satisfied while the PEP is responsible for ensuring that
the decision made by the PDP is enforced. By restricting access based on a set of attributes,
ABAC allows us to restrict or grant access to objects based on credentials that need not
include the user’s actual identity.
ABAC’s core model seen in Figure 2.1, redrawn from (Hu, et al., 2014), contains
an example related to the healthcare domain. In Figure 2.1, Physician Tom, located to the
left side of the figure, possesses the attributes: (ROLE: PHYSICIAN and
PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN for PATIENT_ID: 1). The resource objects, the patient’s
healthcare records located in the right side of the figure, are annotated with the attributes:
(PATIENT_ID, PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN, APPOINTMENT_TIME). The listed access
control rules located in the bottom of the figure indicate that read/write access is granted
to subjects that are the primary physician of the patient and the patient must have an
appointment time matching the current time. Read access is granted to any subject who is
either a nurse or a primary physician. Should Physician Tom request access to the health
record of Patient 1, the PDP will read the access control rules, Physician Tom’s attributes,
the attributes for Patient 1’s health record, and the current time. Physician Tom’s attributes
indicate that he is both a physician and the primary physician for Patient 1. The record
indicates that it is the record for Patient 1 and that the patient has an appointment at the
current time. Since these attributes match the first rule, the PDP decides that Physician
Tom should be granted read/write access to the health record. The PEP ensures that
Physician Tom has read write access to the healthcare record. Suppose that the user is a
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nurse. In this case, the second access control rule is invoked, the PDP decides to grant read
access, and the PEP will enforce the read only access on the requested healthcare record.

Environment
Environment
Conditions
Conditions

CURRENT_TIME

ROLE: PHYSICIAN
PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN for PATIENT_ID: 1
Attribute Based Access
Control Mechanism
Subject
Attributes

Resource

Environment
Object
Conditions

Policy Decision Point

Attributes

Policy Enforcement Point

Physician Tom

READ/WRITE ACCESS: PRIMARY_PHYSICAN
&& APPOINTMENT
READ ACCESS: NURSE || PHYSICIAN

Access

PATIENT_ID
PRIMARY_PHYSICAN
APPOINTMENT_TIME

Environment
Control
Conditions

Rules

Figure 2.1. The ABAC Model.

2.3.

Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)
The Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR

DSTU2, 2015) is a standards framework created by the Health Level Seven (HL7)
organization (HL7, 2011) with the intention of providing easier and quicker
implementation of interoperability in healthcare systems to facilitate access of mHealth
apps to healthcare data in the cloud stored in multiple EHR/HIT systems. One of the main
goals of FHIR is to represent the entities and procedures in healthcare as resources (FHIR
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DSTU2, 2015). There are currently over one hundred forty-five resources (HL7
International, 2019) that can be represented using JSON, XML, or Turtle that can be
utilized to map data from a healthcare system. Sample resources include: Patient,
FamilyMemberHistory,

Condition,

Observation,

Diagnostic

Report,

Medication,

Immunization, AllergyIntolerance, AdverseEvent, etc.; and, for InsurancePlan, Coverage,
EligibilityRequest, Claim, PaymentNotice, etc. The available resources can be accessed
through the means of a RESTful API, which allows to connect healthcare interfaces with
data sources that exist in the cloud. Different from SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol)
(W3C, 2007), which has been the dominant approach to manage web services interfaces
over the past years and is utilized in HL7 v2, RESTful APIs are easier to understand and
to implement as they rely on HTTP and Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD)
operations to develop services. In support of the integration of trust profiles and trust
negotiation with FHIR, we have identified four security levels where security constraints
are applied: the system level, which guards access to the entire EHR and encompasses all
available resources; the resource type level, which guards access to all resources of a given
type (e.g., Observation, Medication Statement, etc.); the resource level, which guards
access to an individual instance of a resource identified by FHIR ID; and, the consent level,
which allows the patient whose healthcare data is described by the resource to introduce
security constraints in support of ONC’s patient consent model (The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, 2019).
One popular open-source library that implements the FHIR specification is the
HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014). HAPI FHIR was developed in
the Java programming language and offers the features of FHIR in addition to other
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features such as the ability to intercept the server (by using Java servlets (Oracle, 2013))
that processes the user’s requests. HAPI FHIR offers the full FHIR REST API in Java and
support for connecting HAPI FHIR to a back end database that stores the healthcare
information. An instance of HAPI FHIR can be configured by extending the
ResourceProvider interface and adding the resulting class to the instance’s resource
providers. The new ResourceProviders are written containing the functionality to interface
with the local database by annotating methods utilizing annotations that mark which
methods are invoked depending on the FHIR REST API calls. A controller may interface
with a HAPI FHIR server by acting as a front end. A new URL endpoint following the
FHIR REST standard is created to which a mobile device that supports trust profiles and
trust negotiation connects. The controller engages in trust negotiation, then retrieves the
requested FHIR data by forwarding the request to the HAPI FHIR installation if trust
negotiation is successful.

2.4.

The Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) App
The Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) app is a collaboration between the

Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at
the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine. The CT 2 app was
created as the result of a new law passed in Connecticut (Connecticut General Assembly,
2015) requiring that concussions be tracked for kids between the ages of 7 to age 19 in
public schools. The CT2 app is used as proof of concept of the approach described
throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Figure 2.2 shows a listing of the various
screens in the CT2 application, which will be described from left to right and top to bottom;
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screens 1 to 4 in the first row and screens 5 to 8 in the second row. Screen 1 is the default
login screen from which users can register an account or log in to an existing account.
Screen 2 is the home screen and allows the user to create or retrieve a new entry for a
student, or to view a list of open concussion cases. Screen 3 is the list screen and displays
a list of students that the user has permission to read or edit. Screen 4 is the new student
screen and allows the user to add general information about a new student such as: first
and last name, the date of birth, the date of the incident, and gender. Screen 5 is the cause
of injury screen that provides functionality to allow the user to provide details about the
injury including: the sport being played, the location the injury occurred, the contact
information, the location of the injury on the student, whether the student was wearing
protective headgear, and any other additional details. Screen 6 is the symptoms within 48
hours screen that allows the input of symptoms the student has felt within 48 hours of the
concussion incident. Inputs include: loss of consciousness and length of loss of
consciousness, whether the parents were notified within 24 hours of the incident, whether
the student was removed from the activity and who removed them from the activity, the
concussion assessment tool used, and any other additional comments. Screen 7 is the injury
follow-up screen and allows input of symptoms past the 48 hour period. Inputs include the
timeframe in which symptoms were resolved, who diagnosed the concussion, whether there
was any other post concussive symdrome diagnoses, the medical imaging used on the
student, and other additional comments. The last screen, screen 8, provides for the input of
when the student is allowed to return to the school. Inputs include days absent from school,
schedule modification, whether a 504 plan is required, the date the student returned to the
school, and the date the student returned to the sport.
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Figure 2.2. The CT2 Application Screens.
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Chapter 3
Infrastructure Requirements for Trust
Negotiation
In this chapter, we describe the infrastructure requirements for trust negotiation and
provide a detailed explanation of the different components involved in trust negotiation
and the interactions among them with examples provided within the healthcare domain.
This chapter consists of 4 sections. Section 3.1 describes Identity and Attribute certificates
that form a verifiable container for the credentials that are necessary for communicating
the components of a trust profile within a domain. Section 3.2 explains the process of trust
negotiation and the communication process that occurs between two participants during
the establishment of mutual trust through the utilization of a controller. Recall that to
support the trust negotiation process, each participating HIT system (for the user or the
data source), has a controller that facilitates the request from the user and utilizes the trust
profile to determine if a user without a pre-existing relationship can access the requested
data. Section 3.3 explorers the Trust Profile Certificate Infrastructure that adopts a chainof-trust model that allows for the creation of new entries for a trust profile by establishing
mutual trust between the trust profile entries of unknown healthcare providers and a method
of verifying trust profile entries. Lastly, Section 3.4 reviews the structure of a controller’s
infrastructure that includes parts and operation in detail. All of the concepts discussed in
Sections 3.1 to 3.4 support expected Contribution A: Infrastructure Requirements to
Promote Trust Among Organizations Participating in Trust Negotiation. Section 3.3 also
supports expected Contribution B: Trust Profile for Recording Complete Records of User
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Access to Sensitive Data while Section 3.4 supports the implementation of expected
Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies. Finally note
that the concepts throughout this chapter can be interpreted in a general manner to apply to
any domain, but in order to make the discussion more relevant in support of the rest of the
dissertation, we focus on the interactions of healthcare organizations. Concepts of Identity
and Attribute certificates in Section 3.1, the trust negotiation and communication in Section
3.2, the trust profile certificate infrastructure in Section 3.3, and the controller
infrastructure in Section 3.4 all are generalizable and applicable to other domains.

3.1.

Identity and Attribute Certificates
A certificate is a file that provides a verifiable digital signature on the data

contained within it. Certificates are widely used to verify that: the user has connected to
the correct server, the connection is secure against man in the middle (MITM) attacks, and
provides a secure manner to negotiate a symmetric key for efficient connection encryption.
The most widely implemented standard for certificates, X.509 (Cooper, et al., 2008),
provides both identity certificates and attribute certificates (Farrell & Housley, 2002).
Although the X.509 identity certificate standard provides provisions for creating additional
attributes, the attribute certificate is useful for shorter lived attributes and for decoupling
the user’s identification attributes from additional descriptive attributes. Pairing identity
and attribute certificates together provides a platform for decentralized authorization
management. The remainder of this section describes identity certificates and the chain of
trust along with a detailed discussion of attribute certificates
An identity certificate is a file that provides ownership information by providing a
verifiable public key. The certificate is used in a public key infrastructure to communicate
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a public key that only the legitimate certificate holder can prove ownership of. By proving
ownership of the public key, the owner also proves ownership of the certificate itself. When
a certificate is created, the owner generates a public/private key pair. The private key is
kept secret, while the public key is entered into a certificate signing request (CSR). When
the certificate has been signed, the certificate acts as a notification as to the owner’s public
key and may be safely disseminated to any interested parties. When the owner of a
certificate needs to be confirmed, it is sufficient to determine that the potential owner
possesses the private key paired with the public key in the certificate, assuming that the
private key has been kept secret by the owner. When another party needs to determine that
they are communicating with the certificate’s owner, a challenge is encrypted by the public
key and sent to the potential owner. If the potential owner is in possession of the private
key, the private key is used to decrypt the challenge. The owner signs the response with
the private key and sends it back to the challenger. If the challenger verifies the response
with the public key and the response is correct, the challenger knows they are
communicating with the certificate’s owner.
An identity certificate consists of multiple parts including: a version number, serial
number, issuer name, validity period, subject name, subject public key, and a certificate
signature. The serial number is an identifier of the certificate and must be unique for each
certificate signed by an issuer. Therefore, each certificate may be uniquely identified by
serial number and issuer. The issuer name describes the signer of the certificate. The
validity period specifies the time period during which the certificate may be considered
valid, consisting of not before and not after dates. The subject name specifies the owner of
the certificate that possesses the private key and often consists of the host domain for which
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the certificate was created. The subject public key is the public key of the owner generated
as part of a public/private key pair and used for identifying the owner. The certificate
signature is a digital signature of the certificate created by the certificate issuer at the time
the certificate is created. The signature consists of a hash of the other information in the
certificate signed with the certificate signer’s private key. The certificate signer, known as
a certificate authority (CA), is the entity from the issuer field and is responsible for
verifying the information in the CSR and creating the digital signature.
The digital signature provided by the CA on the identity certificate is required to
bind the subject to the given public key to enable trust in the signed certificate. Without
the signature to provide verification of the signature data, an attacker could simply provide
a different subject public key paired with their own private key to hijack the connection. In
order to ensure that the digital signature is valid, anyone using the certificate must also
verify the certificate of the signing CA. The X.509 standard supports a chain of trust, or a
linking of digital signatures from the “leaf certificate”, or the first certificate in the chain,
through intermediate CAs, to the root authority. The root authority is the last signature in
the chain. The root authority’s certificate is not signed by a higher CA, but is signed using
the private key of the root authority itself, providing a self-signed certificate. The only
method available for a root authority’s certificate to be verified is if it is already present in
the user’s local certificate store, which is a local collection of certificates whose signatures
are trusted automatically by the user. During verification, a user must obtain each
certificate in the chain, and inspect the signatures starting from the leaf certificate to the
root certificate until: one of the certificates matches a certificate in the certificate store or
the chain ends without matching a certificate in the store. In the former case, the certificates
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are verified and the leaf certificate is considered valid and trustworthy; in the latter case,
the certificate cannot be verified and is considered untrustworthy. An example of the chain
of trust is given in Figure 3.1. In the example, the trust flows from the Root CA Certificate
to the Intermediate CA Certificate to the Leaf Certificate.

Leaf Certificate

Subject Info

Subject
Public Key

Digital Signature

Intermediate CA Certificate

Subject Info

Subject
Public Key

Digital Signature

Root CA Certificate

Subject Info

Subject
Public Key

Digital Signature

Figure 3.1. The Chain of Trust.
An attribute certificate (Farrell & Housley, 2002) is a digitally signed certificate
that can act as an extension to an identity certificate, providing more detailed information
about the owner of the identity certificate. Each attribute certificate can be paired with one
identity certificate. Although attribute certificates are digitally signed, they lack the subject
public key field that allows the certificate owner to authenticate themselves to the
certificate and the data it holds. Attribute certificates are paired with an identity certificate
through the identity certificate’s serial number and issuer field. Although an attribute
certificate can only be paired with a maximum of one identity certificate, multiple attribute
certificates may be attached to the same identity certificate. Attribute certificates have
fields similar to the identity certificate including: the version number, holder, issuer,
signature, a serial number, and validity period. The body of an attribute certificate contains
a list of attributes in key-value pair format. Like the digital signature of the identity
certificate, the attribute certificate’s signature is a computed hash of the other fields of the
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certificate signed with the issuer’s private key. An attribute certificate’s authority is
referred to as attribute authority (AA) and may be chained in the same manner as a
certificate authority (CA). By utilizing attribute certificates in conjunction with identity
certificates, the authentication and authorization data can be separated, with the identity
certificate providing authentication for the certificate owner and the attribute certificate
providing the data necessary for authorization. This allows the identity and authorization
data to be long-lived while providing for the ability to expand upon or change authorization
without the necessity of modifying the identity certificate.

3.2.

Trust Negotiation Process
Trust negotiation (Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) is the process of

establishing mutual trust between two entities through the gradual exchange of credentials.
In this context, trust is the ability for two entities to: believe in the authenticity of one
another’s credentials, utilize those credentials to determine the trustworthiness of each
other with regards to handling sensitive data, and predict that each participant will handle
any transferred sensitive data appropriately and securely. Each trust negotiation procedure
begins with the requestor’s request for sensitive data. The requestor contacts the controller
over a secure connection and sends the controller the first set of credentials it has chosen
to reveal. The controller receives the request for trust negotiation and retrieves a credential
expression, represented byψ, which takes the form of a logical expression that denotes the
credentials that the requestor must possess to obtain access to the requested object. If the
initial set of credentials is sufficient to satisfy the credential expression, the controller
allows the requestor to access the requested object. Otherwise, the controller sends a notice
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to the requestor indicating the remaining required credentials. The requestor may also
request credentials from the controller if required. This allows the use of credentials that
are sensitive by allowing the credentials themselves to be annotated with a desired trust
level. Each round of trust negotiation results in a higher level of trust between the requestor
and controller until the controller’s credential expression is satisfied, or the requestor and
controller no longer have any remaining credentials that may be sent. If the expression is
satisfied, the request for trust negotiation is successful and the requestor obtains access to
the requested object; otherwise, the request for trust negotiation has failed and the requestor
does not obtain access. Adaptive trust negotiation (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, &
Seamons, 2005) refers to trust negotiation where the controller is able to adapt its credential
expressions depending on the requestor’s credentials and the requested object.
The usefulness and flexibility of the trust negotiation process has resulted in
adaptations to mobile devices and healthcare (Vawdrey, Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson,
2003). The credentials involved in trust negotiation are often encoded in certificates.
Surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003) allows the use of a surrogate for mobile
device trust negotiation to assist in the management and disclosure of credentials. A trusted
server may act as a proxy to the mobile device, performing trust negotiation calculations
on its behalf. Credential disclosure may be controlled by trust agents, which are
autonomous programs that disclose secure credentials based on pre-defined credential
access policies. A remote trust agent running on a surrogate must be completely trusted by
the user because the trust agent manages both credential disclosure and the certificate’s
private keys.
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As a healthcare focused example of adaptive trust negotiation, consider Physician
Tom attempting to access his patient’s health record at a remote hospital as shown in Figure
3.2. Physician Tom possesses credentials indicating his medical licensing, his current
workplace, and that he is the patient’s practicing physician (Certificates License,
Employer, Inpatient in the upper left side of Figure 3.2 under Tom). Physician Tom uses
his mobile device to connect to his local hospital’s Local Trust Agent server in order to
initiate a Trust Negotiation Request (line 1 in Figure 3.2) to the Remote Hospital’s EHR.
The EHR receives the Request for Patient Record (line 2 in Figure 3.2), creates a
Credential Expression (line 3 in Figure 3.2), and sends the Credential Expression to
Physician Tom (line 4 in Figure 3.2). The Credential Expression sent indicates that
indicates that access to the record will be provided if: the requestor is licensed, employed
at a known healthcare organization, and is currently treating the patient. The Local Trust
Agent sends a credential with Tom’s medical license and a request for a credential
indicating that the EHR’s security has been certified by an outside healthcare security
consultant (line 5 in Figure 3.2). The EHR verifies the Medical License and sends a
credential indicating the Security Certification back to the trust agent (line 6 in Figure 3.2).
The Local Trust Agent, satisfied that the EHR is secure, sends the remaining current
employment (Employer) and Inpatient treatment credentials (line 7 in Figure 3.2). The
EHR receives them and verifies them. Now that the Credential Expression has been
satisfied (line 8 in Figure 3.2), the EHR reports a successful trust negotiation attempt and
sends the patient’s Health Record to Physician Tom, who is now able to view the patient’s
health record on his mobile device (line 9 in Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Trust Negotiation Request.

3.3.

Trust Profile Certificate Infrastructure
The trust profile is capable of establishing trust between the requestor (e.g.,

physician, nurse, health insurance representative, etc.) and an organization’s EHR by
providing a standard set of credentials describing sensitive data access allowed by a peer
organization (e.g., another hospital). Before the controller can make a decision as to
whether the trust profile contains sufficient credentials to access the requested sensitive
material, the credentials themselves must be valid to ensure that the credentials describe
real accesses to other organizations. The trust profile’s data can be trusted as valid if: the
trust profile owner’s ownership is confirmed through the identity certificate’s public key,
the digital signatures listed in the identity and attribute certificates are valid, and the
controller confirms that the signers of the identity attribute certificates are authorized to
create certificates for the trust profile entries. This third requirement ensures that a
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controller only trusts the judgement of real organizations and prevents an attacker from
creating and signing their own trust profile certificates.
In order to establish trust among the healthcare organizations participating in trust
negotiation, they must each trust mutual medical authorities. A medical authority performs
a function similar to the certificate authorities that sign certificates for secure
communication for website login data. The medical authority is responsible for signing
X.509 CA certificates for each healthcare organization’s CA and AA. Medical authorities
provide their root certificates for healthcare organizations to validate the digital signatures
on the trust profile entries digitally signed by their peers, whose CA and AA certificates
were signed by the medical authority. Unlike a certificate authority, whose role may be
limited to verifying that the certificate owner of the certificate the CA signed owns the
domain listed in the certificate, the medical authority is also responsible for ensuring that
the healthcare organizations’ private keys that match the public keys listed in their CA
certificates are stored in a safe and secure manner. Theft of the private key threatens the
validity of the portions of trust profiles signed with the stolen private key since those entries
could be forged. A signature from a valid medical authority on a healthcare organization’s
CA and AA certificates builds trust by ensuring that proper security measures are being
properly followed.
The establishment of trust from the medical authority, to the local healthcare
organization, to the trust profile owner follows the X.509 chain of trust model as previously
shown in Figure 3.1. In the chain of trust model, validation of a certificate starts with the
last certificate in the chain, the leaf certificate depicted in the left side of Figure 3.1, and
travels up the chain through one or more CA certificates until either one of the CA
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certificates matches a certificate in the local certificate store or the last, self-signed root
authority certificate is found. The medical authority, whose certificate is represented by the
Root CA Certificate in the right side of Figure 3.1, establishes trust between the various
healthcare organizations participating in trust negotiation by signing the CA and AA
certificates of the healthcare organization in the middle of Figure 3.1 and making its own
self-signed root certificate available. Any healthcare organization that places a copy of the
medical authority’s root certificate in their local certificate store indicates that any
certificates signed by the medical authority are trustworthy. Using this process, those
healthcare organizations also indicate that peer healthcare organizations’ CAs and AAs
that are signed by the medical authority are also trustworthy. This chain of trust flows
downward into the certificates that comprise a healthcare professional’s trust profile. Thus,
trust flows from the medical authority to the CAs and AAs of healthcare organizations
sharing sensitive data to the healthcare professionals employed by those healthcare
organizations attempting to obtain sensitive data. Multiple medical authorities may be
present on the network and healthcare organizations are free to choose which medical
authorities will be trusted, as well as choosing individual healthcare organizations to trust
directly through the local certificate store.
In the event of a security breach resulting in a problem with the private keys of a
set of trust profile certificates, the CAs or AAs may issue an entry in their certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) as specified by the X.509 standard (Cooper, et al., 2008). Likewise,
the certificates of a compromised or misbehaving CA or AA may also be revoked by the
medical authority if the CA or AA fails to meet proper security requirements or issues
invalid trust profile entries. The X.509 standard provides for a CRL, which is a digitally
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signed list of the serial numbers of certificates that should not be considered valid, and
information regarding their current state of trustworthiness. During certificate validation,
the certificate validator must consult an up-to-date CRL, with all trust profile entries whose
certificates appear on the CRL not being considered acceptable for use in trust negotiation.
Whether trust negotiation immediately fails depends on the listed reason for certificate
invalidation. For instance, the CRL may list that hackers have stolen the owner’s primary
key, and thus proper ownership of the certificates cannot be ascertained. The CRL also
provides the function of allowing employers to terminate trust profile entries indicating
current employment should the employee change jobs.
Figure 3.3 depicts an example trust network with multiple medical authorities
establishing trust among Family Medical Center (FMC), Saint Francis Hospital (SFH), and
Hartford Hospital (HH). In Figure 3.3, the dashed arrows represent that the healthcare
organizations’ CA and AA certificates have been signed by that medical authority, and that
the medical authority has performed security audits on the healthcare organizations’ trust
negotiation setup. The dashed arrows also represent that the local trust certificate store
contains a copy of the medical authority’s self-signed certificate, since the medical
authority that signed the healthcare organization’s CA and AA is trusted by default. The
solid arrows represent trust placed in the medical authority by the local healthcare
organization by placing the medical authority’s self-signed certificate into the local trust
certificate store. Each of these healthcare organizations is therefore able to trust the others’
entries in trust profile certificates, since during certificate validation each certificate chain
will result in eventually validating a medical authority certificate that appears in the local
certificate store even though each healthcare organization has been audited and signed by
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a different medical authority. This system allows for multiple competing medical
authorities and prevents creating a single point of failure on the network, while still
allowing trust to be created and disseminated with a distributed approach.
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Figure 3.3. Example Network With Multiple Medical Authorities.

3.4.

Controller Structure
The trust profile combined with an adaptive trust negotiation approach is dependent

on the interactions occurring between the users’ trust profile and the controllers. This
adaptive approach and the organic growth of the trust profile requires a more complex
controller. We have organized the Trust Negotiation Server into five distinct components
as depicted in the boxed area of the right side of Figure 3.4. The five components are: the
Trust Profile Validation component, the Security Policy Matching component, the Security
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Policy Generation component, the Credential Generation component, and the Data
Collection and Delivery component. The responsibilities of the five components include:
verifying the trust profile’s structure and content; determining proper ownership of the trust
profile without needing to verify a specific identity; matching the user’s chosen subset of
the trust profile against a security administrator-defined security policy on the requested
data; delivering the requested sensitive data from the EHR to the requestor, including any
necessary modifications required by the adaptive approach specified in the security policy;
and, communicating with the user and the local CA and AA to create a new entry for the
user’s trust profile. Finally note that the blue ovals in the Trust Negotiations server box of
Figure 3.4 can be leveraged for other domains.
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Figure 3.4. The Controller Structure.
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When authorization through trust negotiation is requested by the user, the controller
begins by receiving the request and validating the initial certificates passed by the user.
The Trust Profile Validation component verifies the certificates so other components of the
Controller are able to trust the credentials and determine if they are sufficient for data
access. The Security Policy Generation component reads the security metadata attached to
the requested Medical Data using the FHIR standard and uses this data as well as
administrator provided Security Policy Generation rules to generate a credential expression
that the Security Policy Matching component will match the user’s Trust Profile against to
determine whether access is granted. The Security Policy Generation component is also
responsible for generating ancillary release actions, such as triggering logging records or
redacting data that the user has not obtained enough trust to receive. The Security Policy
Matching component is responsible for receiving the generated security policy as a
credential expression and matching it to Trust Profile entries extracted from the previously
validated trust profile certificates. This component also notifies the user if the credentials
previously sent are insufficient and the nature of the credentials that must be presented in
order to build further trust. Further presented Trust Profile credentials are passed to the
Trust Profile Validation component to be verified before the Security Policy Matching
component receives them for as many trust negotiation rounds as necessary. When the
Security Policy Matching component decides the user has been successful in obtaining
trust, it notifies the Credential Generation and Data Collection and Delivery components.
The Credential Generation component communicates with the user to add trust profile
entries detailing the successful access to data, while the Data Collection and Delivery
component gathers the requested data, performs any necessary transformations on the data
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(e.g., converting to a FHIR interoperability format, redacting data that should not be sent
to the user, etc.), and performs any ancillary actions required by the security policy (e.g.,
dispatching emails to the hospital’s auditor in the case of a high risk transaction).
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Chapter 4
Trust Profile Model and Adaptive Trust
Negotiation Approach
In this chapter, we describe our extensions to the adaptive trust negotiation
framework introduced and discussed in Section 3.2 in order to provide a formal trust profile
model that is able to represent all of the necessary concepts for tracking a user, a users trust
profile, the controller, and all of the underlying concepts that are necessary to facilitate the
trust negotiation process. In support of this, this chapter consists of 4 sections. Section 4.1
describes the trust profile’s structure and usage in detail, focusing on all of the required
constructs and the way that they interact with one another, that are required to support the
formal model to be presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.2 presents and explains the formal
model for supporting trust profiles in the trust profile negotiation process which allows
each organization (e.g., a hospital or a medical practice) that supports trust negotiation to
independently protect their health data while being able to endorse users as trustworthy
from other organizations (other hospitals or medical practices or any HIT system) as well.
Section 4.3 provides an example of the concepts presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in the
healthcare domain to clearly demonstrate the applicability of our work in practice in a
realistic setting, fully illustrating the concept and content of a trust profile along with the
trust negotiation that occurs with the controller to allow for a decision to be made about
access to the requested sensitive data. Please note that our approach can work with any
organization that requires control of highly sensitive information. Section 4.4 presents
related work in applying trust negotiation techniques to the mobile and healthcare domains
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and compares and contrasts the releated works to our research. All of the concepts
discussed in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 support expected Contribution B: Trust Profile for
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data while Section 4.3 also
supports the implementation of expected Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive
Access Control Policies.

4.1.

The Trust Profile Concept
The trust profile is an extension to the concept of trust negotiation (Winsborough,

Seamons, & Jones, 2000) that provides an automated form of trust gain over the course of
a user interacting with a secure system over a period of time. This is accomplished by the
accumulation of credentials over time as the user securely accesses the authenticated HIT
systems to which they have been authorized. The result is a historical record that is
summarized as the trust that the owner has obtained over the course of a long career
handling sensitive information. As the user demonstrates the capacity to obtain, utilize, and
protect this secure information, there is often an expansion in the user’s responsibilities
within an organization and an increased ability to access more heavily secured information.
This trust is accumulated as the trust profile is updated over the lifetime that the user is
working for any organization which requires access to sensitive data. The trust profile’s
strength is its ability to automatically model this increase in trust placed in the user without
the need for constant human intervention. The trust profile records all of the owner’s access
to sensitive information, whether it is accessed locally or remotely; or accessed from the
user’s current employment with an organization (e.g., for our purposes a healthcare
organization such as a hospital or a medical practice), past employment with an
organization (e.g., a physician who previously worked as an intern or resident at a hospital),
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or from another organization with no pre-existing relationship with the user. In the event
that the user requires access to sensitive data in a time critical situation from another
organization that the user has not been pre-authorized to access, the user can enter trust
negotiation with the data’s controller, utilizing a subset of individual records of sensitive
data access within the trust profile as a set of credentials, supplemented by traditional static
credentials common in trust negotiation such as medical licensing. Note that from this point
on we omit the use of healthcare references as we discuss the concept of trust profiles in
the formal model in more general terms.
In addition to the trust profile’s ability to model the user’s increase in
trustworthiness by accumulating credentials throughout the user’s career, we also introduce
adaptiveness to the process by providing additional actions to the controller that may be
undertaken depending on how the controller interprets the credentials offered in the trust
profile and the details of the user’s initial request for data resource access. Local
administrators of the controller may define methods for the controller to fine-tune the level
of trust present in a trust negotiation attempt by creating sets of release actions that the
controller may undertake to increase security assurance while also providing methods to
make sensitive data more available, particularly in time critical or emergency situations.
For instance, an administrator may define that a requestor requesting access to a patient’s
drug list must present at least three credentials from the trust profile indicating that the
requestor has successfully accessed patient drug data in the past and at least one credential
from the trust profile indicating access to the health record of the requested patient from
the controller in the past. The administrator creates a set of release actions indicating that
access to the requested patient’s health record may also be allowed if the access occurred
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at another organization. In the case that the access occurred at another organization, access
would still be allowed from the requested organization, whose controller would note the
access in the audit log as a higher risk transaction and a notification would be dispatched
to the organization’s local auditor. This allows the requestor multiple secure paths to access
sensitive, time-critical data without compromising health record security and for swift
responses on the part of the local organization should sensitive health data be obtained
inappropriately.
Every stakeholder (e.g., physicians, nurses, specialists, pharmacists, insurance
agents, healthcare researchers, therapists, etc.) must be provided with a trust profile to
access secure data when they first have a need to access sensitive data. Note this might also
occur as part of the overall authorization and authentication process when new employees
are created and given permissions on the local database. The stakeholder’s employer is
responsible for initializing the trust profile, which marks the stakeholder as having been
manually vetted by the organization during pre-employment and having been found to be
trustworthy in handling highly sensitive data. If the stakeholder later leaves the employer
and finds employment elsewhere, the stakeholder retains the trust profile and the data
contained within, as the trust profile is a permanent record of the stakeholder’s sensitive
data access over an entire career. These are essentially credentials that an individual takes
with them as they move between different locations to administer care to patients. The
stakeholder no longer has entries in the trust profile indicating that the owner is currently
an associate of the previous employer, but retains data indicating previous employment
during the period when the entries were made. The stakeholder is then free to obtain
employment with a new organization, obtains a new entry indicating employment with the
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new organization, and may use any previous entries in the trust profile during trust
negotiation.
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Figure 4.1. Example Trust Profile Negotiation.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the connection between the trust profile owner, the owner’s
employers, and the controllers. In Figure 4.1, Jane, a medical provider, possesses a mobile
device from Family Medical Center (FMC) loaded with their mHealth app. The mHealth
app is capable of accessing FMC’s EHR with traditional credentials, but also supports
requesting access from other EHRs, such as St. Francis Hospital (SFH) and Hartford
Hospital (HH) through trust profile-based trust negotiation. The Trust arrows to/from FMC
and SFH to the Trust Profile (TP) indicate that Jane has entries in her Trust Profile from
both FMC and SFH, meaning that Jane has previously obtained access to sensitive data
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from FMC and SFH and that those accesses have been recorded in the Trust Profile. Should
Jane require access to her patient’s health data located at HH, the mHealth app will send a
subset of the Trust Profile, compiled into a digital wallet, to HH’s Trust Negotiation Server.
The entries chosen from the Trust Profile indicate the level of trust from both FMC, Jane’s
current employer, and SFH, a different healthcare organization Jane established trust with
previously utilizing trust negotiation. HH’s Trust Negotiation Server finds indications in
the Trust Profile from FMC indicating that Jane is a current employee and has been
manually vetted, while the entries from SFH indicate additional trust. HH’s Trust
Negotiation Server decides whether the credentials are sufficient, and if negotiation
successful returns the requested data and a new entry for the Trust Profile describing the
access.
The trust profile is implemented as a collection of identity and attribute certificates.
Attribute certificates encode the trust profile data in a key-value pair relationship. The
identity certificate serves as a method of authenticating ownership of the attribute
certificates presented during trust negotiation to the user. The dual use of identity and
attribute certificates is required because the X.509 standard does not provide a method of
verifying ownership of an attribute certificate using public key infrastructure. Instead, each
attribute certificate is associated with an X.509 identity certificate that does provide
ownership verification through the listed public key. During trust negotiation, all attribute
certificates sent must also be paired with their identity certificate or ownership cannot be
verified. Once ownership of the identity certificate has been verified by verifying that the
requestor possesses the private key associated with the listed public key in the identity
certificate, the attribute certificates’ ownership is verified by affirming their association to
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a previously verified identity certificate. The encoded identity information stored within
the identity certificates is not required to specifically identify the trust profile owner, but
to ensure that the requestor is the owner of the attribute certificates chosen to form a subset
of the trust profile for trust negotiation. The user obtains one identity certificate from the
controller of each system accessed during the first successful attempt to request sensitive
data. The identity certificate does not contain any access history specific data.
The attribute certificates contain individual entries that describe an access. Each
sensitive data access results in at least one new attribute certificate, which is associated
with the identity certificate obtained from the controller. Thus, a trust profile is comprised
of one or more identity certificates, each representing at least one access from a controller;
and each identity certificate will have one or more attribute certificates attached to it, each
attribute certificate representing one aspect of access to one specific requested resource.
These attribute certificates may represent: access to a requested object, the sensitivity level
of the requested object, or a sensitivity level representing the highest sensitivity object the
trust profile owner has obtained from the controller of that system. A fourth attribute
certificate is provided that represents a current employer of the owner and denotes that the
owner has been manually vetted by the employer during the course of employment. This
fourth attribute certificate must be assigned manually by the employer. This combination
of identity and attribute certificates provides the flexibility of being able to encode multiple
accesses to sensitive data to the same healthcare organization using attribute certificates,
while also minimizing the number of ownership verifications of identity certificates.
Minimizing the number of public key ownership verifications is important because the
calculations necessary to verify a public key are relatively slow and difficult to perform,
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which may overtax less powerful CPUs on mobile devices or trust negotiation servers
handling multiple concurrent requests.
An example trust profile subset is displayed in Figure 4.2. The physician illustrated
has obtained secure access to Family Health Center, UCHC, and SFH in the past and
possesses an identity certificate from each, representing the trust he has obtained from each
organization. On the first access to each of these organizations, the controller has informed
him of successful access and requested a new public key for the identity certificate. The
attribute certificates associated with the identity certificate, whose associations are
represented with arrows connecting the certificates, represent aspects of each successful
access to the controller that created the associated identity certificate. During a new request
for sensitive data, the physician may choose any combination of attribute certificates and
their associated identity certificates and present the accesses the certificates represent as
proof of trust obtained from those systems. Further accesses to systems that issue the
identity certificates result in new attribute certificates detailing the access with new
associations to that identity certificate, while access to the previously unknown Hartford
Hospital as pictured will require the generation of a new X.509 identity certificate and new
attribute certificates for the specific data accessed.
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St. Francis
Hospital

Medical
Authority for
HIE via HAPI
FHIR

Figure 4.2. Example Trust Profile Structure.

4.2.

A Trust Profiling Model for Trust Negotiation
In this section, we propose and explain a model for trust negotiation that presents a

new trust profile that utilizes role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu,
Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La
Padula, 1976), and attribute-based access control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014) to model the
sensitivity of information being requested, governed by role with credentials captured in
attributes via ABAC. Recall that trust is the ability for two entities to believe one another
and trust negotiation (Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) is a process of two entities
with no pre-existing knowledge of one another building trust by exchanging digital
credentials. Our work specifically extends the trust negotiation approach by creating a
living trust profile containing a complete record of the user’s access history. The remainder
of this section presents a formal model definition for the trust profile that is characterized
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by the confidentiality of requested information to be accessed, role-based capabilities, and
attributed-based access control to capture credentials. Note that this model is independent
of the healthcare domain, it is a realization of the trust profile concepts as given in Figures
1.1 and 1.2. Continuing on with the discussion in the early portions of this dissertation, we
leverage the healthcare domain and associated examples to explain the model concepts.
To begin the discussion of the formal model for trust profiles, we define a number
of key terms.
Defn. 1: A User, U = <uid, uname>, is a trust profile owner identified by id and name.
Defn. 2: A Requestor, R = <rid, rname>, is a user engaged in trust negotiation by id and
name.
Defn. 3: A Controller, C = <cid, cname>, accepts requests for trust negotiation by id and
name.
Defn. 4: A Security Agent, SA = <said, saname>, is an autonomous entity that manages
receiving and disclosing credentials on behalf of a Requestor or Controller
denoted respectively as SARequestor or SAController identified by id and name.
Defn. 5: A Credential Expression, ψ, is a logical expression that represents the credentials
necessary to establish trust between a Requestor (SARequestor) and Controller
(SAController).
Defn. 6: A data resource is defined in two different steps;
a. A Data Resource Descriptor, DRDescriptor = <DRType, DRCRUD>, provides a

DRType that identifies the type of resource requested (e.g., a FHIR patient
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resource , an object in JSON or XML format) and DRCRUD a set of CRUD
operations (CREATE | READ | UPDATE | DELETE) R wishes to perform
on the requested object.
b. A Data Resource, DR = <DRDescriptor, DRID>, is identified by a DRID unique
identifier and DRDescriptor the type of resource requested. The DR represents
a portion of information of interest.
Defn. 7: A System, S = <SName, SID, DRSset > is identified by SID unique identifier, SName the
name of the system (e.g., an HIT system such as an EHR), and DRSset the set of
all data resources (e.g., the set of all FHIR resources in an EHR) for the system
as given in Defn. 6.
Defn. 8: A Role, r, is a designation that represents the types of tasks the role’s owner is
expected to perform (e.g., physician, psychiatrist, nurse, etc.).
Briefly, we review the definitions. Controllers guard data and determine access to
a data resource DR whereas requestors initiate the request for a resource. A credential
expression, denoted ψ, represents the credentials that must be presented by the requestor to
the controller to release a resource. If a set of credentials c satisfies ψ, it is denoted as
𝑠𝑎𝑡(c, 𝜓) (see Defn. 5). In healthcare, a participant would be a physician attempting to
access an EHR or a hospital that possesses a patient’s EHR. A controller would be a
repository of public health data or a hospital that possesses a patient’s EHR, and credential
expressions would be utilized to determine the records of access to health records that must
be present in the physician’s presented trust profile to obtain access to a new health record.
During negotiation, the requestor and controller alternate exchanging credentials through
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security agents SA (see Defn. 4). The requestor and controller each possess their own SA
that is responsible for releasing the owner’s credentials and receiving the other participant’s
credentials. The process of exchanging credentials, depending on the level of trust
established, continues until either the requestor has established enough trust with the
controller to complete the request, or it is determined that trust cannot be established. If the
exchanged credentials are insufficient to establish trust, a Server Governance Policy (SGP)
is exchanged to alert the other participant to the credentials required to complete the
negotiation. Defn. 6a and 6b provide methods for identifying specific records that R is
performing the negotiation to obtain. The DRDescriptor is comprised of a DRType, which denotes
the type of FHIR resource requested, such as a patient medication, and a DRCRUD which
indicates the CRUD operations the requester R wants to perform on the requested resource.
The user U corresponds with the Physician pictured in Figure 4.2 When the
Physician sends a request for trust negotiation, the Physician becomes the Requestor R.
The uid is the unique combination of the issuer and serial number present on the identity
certificates in the trust profile while uname is specified in the domain field as a
name@domain pairing. These identity certificates are represented in Figure 4.2 in the
X.509 identity certificates provided by Family Health Center, UCHC, and St. Francis
Hospital. The controller as presented in the formal definition refers to the HIT Controller
structure presented in Figure 3.4 introduced in Section 3.4. The <cid, cname> pairing
represents the unique serial number/issuer combination listed on the HIT Controller’s
Medical Authority certificate and the name is the controller’s domain name. The controller
is responsible for protecting the data of the system in Defn. 7, which is represented by the
Medical Data in Figure 3.4. The DR is a request for the Medical Data, whose data is
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categorized by type and annotated with HAPI FHIR Security Data utilized by the HIT
Controller to generate the credential expression ψ. The role specified in Defn. 8 refers not
only to the role the user U has chosen to perform trust negotiation under, but also references
the trust profile entries that record the user’s role at the time of a sensitive data access
during a successful trust negotiation. These records are illustrated in the Trust Profile
presented in Figure 4.3.
Given the initial set of definitions, the next set of definitions formalizes the
components and structure of the trust profile including: access history properties, digital
signatures, access history records, identity certificates, attribute certificates, the trust
profile itself, and the digital wallet.
Defn. 9: An Access History Property, AHP = <ptype, pvalue>, is a single property that
describes one attribute describing past access to a resource.
Defn. 10:

An Issuer, I = <idIssuer, PubKeyIssuer>, is a controller that creates entries for

a requestor’s trust profile.
Defn. 11:

A Digital Signature, DS

= sign(PrivKeyIssuer, hash(IC)),

is

a

cryptographically-signed assurance that the signed content is both valid and
unaltered since the information has been signed. A DS establishes the authenticity
of a portion of the trust profile. The signature is created by encrypting a hash of
the content the user’s IC or AC with the issuer’s private key.
Defn. 12:

An Access History Record, AHR = < AHR 1, AHR 2, …, AHR n>, is a set of

properties describing access to one resource. The number and types of properties
listed in an AHR vary depending on the resource whose access they describe.
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Defn. 13:

An Identity Certificate, IC = <idUser, PubKeyUser, idIssuer, dsIssuer>, binds all

attribute certificates issued for a single user from a single organization to a public
key, allowing controllers to determine ownership of the attribute certificates by
asking the requestor to prove knowledge of the associated private key (a
cryptographic challenge).
Defn. 14:

An Attribute Certificate, AC = <ic, dsissuer, type, t, opt> contains information

to be tracked on a requestor’s actions over time and is a five tuple that has: an
identity certificate, ic, per Defn. 13; a digital signature, ds, per Defn. 11; the type
of the AC; a timestamp indicating the time of access; and, a set of optional, opt,
values depending on type. The four types of ACs with opt information are:
a. ACDataResourceAccess: A record of a single access to a specific resource in a particular
system by role (AHR) where opt=<uid, rid, drid, sysid> are the user, assigned
role, data resource, and system.
b. ACAffiliation: An affiliation of an organization on a network where opt=<uid, affilid>
are user and affiliation ids for a given user.
c. ACDataResourceConfidentiality: A confidentiality level for a specific resource where opt=<uid,
cl, drid, sysid> for a given user is the clearance level of the data resource and
its system.
d. ACSystemConfidentiality: A confidentiality level that is the highest level of sensitivity for

each system that has been accessed by the user at any time where opt=<uid, cl,
sysid> for a given user is the clearance level of the system.
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Note that in our model, ICs and AC s are created upon successful trust negotiation
by a controller for future use of the requestor (the user). Consequently, the exact properties
used to describe the access are dependent on the controller and the domain. For instance,
when accessing electronic healthcare records (EHRs) in the healthcare domain, the
properties may include: the role under which access is allowed, the exact record that was
accessed, the type of record accessed (e.g., MRI scan, general health record, drug list, etc.),
the patient whose record was accessed, whether the requestor was an employee or the
access was remote at the time of access, and a timestamp denoting the exact time of access.
Affiliation is an endorsement of a subset of the user’s trust profile by a controller
that has vetted the user more thoroughly and endorses the user’s continued use of trust
negotiation to obtain access to related resources. For instance, in the healthcare field, a
physician participating in trust negotiation would have current affiliations with his/her
current employer(s), who would be a healthcare organization trusted by other controllers
within the healthcare network. A controller that grants a user an affiliation serves the dual
purpose of providing initial entries into the user’s trust profile, establishing assurance that
the user is in good standing, and providing additional assurance that the user has a needto-know when the controller protects need-to-know data. Note that affiliation exists in both
an ACDataResourceAccess as a property and at a higher level in the trust profile (see Defn. 15).
Affiliation attached to a subset of the trust profile indicates current affiliation, or whether
the requestor is currently affiliated with the controller noted in the trust profile, while the
affiliation property in an ACDataResourceAccess denotes whether the requestor was affiliated with the
controller at the time of access. This is useful for situations when the affiliation was with a
past employer and the user is employed elsewhere.
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During a request for sensitive information, the context in which the request is made
is important. Different requestors may have a legitimate need to request the same resource,
but as access history is highly customized, the evaluation of trust profiles must
accommodate a wide variety of entries. This requires the controller to be flexible in
accepting the credential expressions generated for each attempted negotiation. For
example, a family physician requesting a patient’s electronic health record from a specialist
(e.g., cardiologist) the patient has seen recently can be reasonably expected to have entries
in his/her personal trust profile showing a history of access to the patient’s records in the
local EHR. However, a physician working in an ER is much less likely to be treating a
patient he/she has seen before, but should be able to present a trust profile indicating the
treatment of multiple patients in an ER setting. In support of this functionality, the trust
profile model has definitions for a data resource DR = <DRDescriptor, DRID> with an associated
type DRType from Defns. 6a and 6b coupled with a request context. The next definition
pulls all of the concepts together to define a trust profile:
Defn. 15:

A Trust Profile, TP = <tpname, uid, tpAS, tpDRAS, tpDRCS, tpSCS, tpDW > where:

 tpname is the name to identify the profile,
 uid is the unique identity of a user,
 tpAS is the Affiliation Set (AS) of ACs ACAffiliation from Defn. 14b that contains all
of the user’s employment(s) or direct contact with the issuing organization,
 tpDRAS is the Data Resource Access Set (DRAS) that contains a set of
ACDataResourceAccess from Defn. 14a where each ACDataResourceAccess represents access by role
to a data resource,
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 tpDRCS is the Data Resource Confidentiality Set (DRCS) that contains a set of
ACs ACDataResourceConfidentiality from Defn. 14c where each ACDataResourceConfidentiality represents the
confidentiality of an accessed data resource,
 tpSCS is the System Confidentiality Set (SCS) that contains a set of ACSystemConfidentiality
from Defn. 14d where each ACSystemConfidentiality represents the confidentiality of a
specific accessed system, and
 tpDW is the Digital Wallet that contains a set of attribute certificates that are a

subset of ACs from tpAS, tpDRAS, tpDRCS, and tpSCS that represents the credentials
being submitted by the requestor.
In support of the process, we conceptualize the Digital Wallet as the set of subject
attributes the requestor (SARequestor) sends to be evaluated. The security agents SARequestor and

SAController manage the disclosure of credentials for the duration of the negotiation. As
illustrated in Figure 4.3, the Trust Profile is gradually released from SARequestor to SAController. The
Trust Negotiation component receives the request for a resource and the Trust Profile from

SAController. The resource is annotated with attributes of its own, represented by Resource
Object Attributes in Figure 4.3, that include the Patient’s ID, the physician assigned to the
patient as the Primary Physician, the patient’s Appointment Time, and the Sensitivity Level
of the resource. When the Trust Negotiation component has received the credentials from
the Trust Profile, the PDP attempts to match the subject attributes in the Trust Profile to
the Resource Object Attributes and the Environment Conditions through ψ, which is
created by the Trust Negotiation component from the Access Control Rules based on the
type of resource being requested, the requestor’s Role, and the Sensitivity Level of the
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resource from the Access Control Rules. The Sensitivity Level of the requestor is
determined based on the type of resource being requested, the Role of the requestor, and
the contents of the Trust Profile.

Environment
Environment
Conditions
Conditions

CURRENT_TIME

PATIENT_ID
PRIMARY_PHYSICAN
APPOINTMENT_TIME
SENSITIVITY_LEVEL

ROLE: PHYSICIAN
PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN for PATIENT_ID: 1

SARequestor

Trust
Profile

SAController

ABAC
PDP
PEP

Ψ
Generation

Resource

Environment
Object
Conditions

Attributes

Trust Negotiation

READ/WRITE ACCESS: PRIMARY_PHYSICAN
&& APPOINTMENT
READ ACCESS: NURSE || PHYSICIAN

Access

Environment
Control
Conditions

Rules

Release
Environment
Conditions
Actions

LOG: High Risk
LOG: Low Risk
Dispatch Audit Notification
Add/Edit/Delete Data

Figure 4.3. Integrated Trust Profile, ABAC, and Trust Negotiation.
For example, suppose a DR is an EHR that contains mental health data tagged with
a sensitivity level of V (see Table 2.1), indicating that the mental health data is considered
very sensitive and must be treated with utmost care. The requestor is the patient’s
psychiatrist and has multiple entries indicating access to the patient’s health records. The
psychiatrist initiates a request for the EHR under the psychiatrist role. The credential
expression, ψ, generated by the Trust Negotiation component, will allow access if the trust
profile indicates previous treatment of the patient and the psychiatrist meets the required
V sensitivity level. The Trust Negotiation component determines that the sensitivity level
will be met if the psychiatrist presents a trust profile indicating that he/she has accessed
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data under the psychiatrist role, has accessed the patient’s data specifically, and the patient
is known to currently have an appointment with him/her. The psychiatrist’s trust profile
fulfills the first two requirements, and the PDP indicates that the current time from the
Environment Conditions matches an appointment noted in the patient’s records. The
psychiatrist meets the sensitivity requirement, a new entry is made in the trust profile
indicating successful access to the requested data, and the requested data is sent to the
psychiatrist. The presented trust profile has fulfilled the requirements and the release
actions LOG: High Risk and Dispatch Audit Notification are executed for the sensitivity
level V transaction to provide further assurances of resource security, stored as part of
AHR.
The final set of definitions is for the interactions between the trust profile, the
request context, and the credential expression during trust negotiation.
Defn. 16:

A Request Context, RC, is a three-tuple that combines the resource, trust

profile, and role as: RC = < 𝐷𝑅, 𝑡𝑝
Defn. 17:

,𝑟 >

The controller’s credential expression Cψ is a logical expression whose

clauses correspond to credentials c that must be present in TP to allow access to

DR.
Defn. 18:

The controller’s set of release actions, RA, is defined as a set of actions for

the controller to execute depending on the received credentials if the credential
expression ψ is satisfied.
Defn. 19:

The credential expression ψ is satisfied iff the presented credentials have

established sufficient trust to release the resource.
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Defn. 20:

A Transaction, T, is a series of data exchanges between Requestor and

Controller, initiated by the Requestor with an RC, continues with disclosures of
tpDW, and ends when the Controller determines trust cannot be established or
when ψ is satisfied. If ψ is satisfied the Requestor receives a new entry in the trust
profile, receives the requested data, and the Controller executes all actions in RA.
Defn. 21:

The Transaction, T, is valid iff ψ is satisfied and the controller has executed

actions specified in RA: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝑇) = 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑐, 𝜓) +RA
When a request for trust negotiation is initiated, the requestor creates a Request
Context (Defn. 16), which consists of the resource (e.g., patient EHR, public health data,
etc.) the requestor would like to access, initial trust profile data, and the role the requestor
possesses in his/her trust profile and would like to use for the trust negotiation. Using the
request context, the controller creates a credential expression that represents the constraints
that the trust profile must satisfy to obtain access to the requested resource. The controller
may also take other actions depending on which constraints are satisfied. For instance, a
family physician seeing a new patient may not have an access history in the trust profile
indicating past treatment. A trust profile that has an affiliation with an organization but no
previous interaction with the patient may result in a decision to allow access and send a
notification to the controller’s organization’s auditor that the transaction requires review.
During the trust negotiation procedure, a subset of the trust profile chosen by the
requestor acts as a set of credentials whose release is negotiated during trust negotiation.
Each record of access in the access history forms one credential. Once a base level of trust
is established between the controller and the requestor, the requestor chooses to send
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subsets of the trust profile to satisfy the remaining portions of the controller’s credential
expression to obtain access to data. The controller’s credential expression is generated
subject to the data being requested and the role the requestor possesses for the session. If
the requestor is able to satisfy the controller’s credential expression and access is obtained,
the controller adds its own entries to the user’s trust profile that can satisfy the requirements
of future attempts at trust negotiation with any other controller. Additionally, the controller
may take other actions depending on the credentials presented, such as calculating
transformations (addition, modification, deletion, etc.) on the data or dispatching audit
notifications. Figure 4.3 illustrates a modification of the ABAC model from Figure 2.1 that
incorporates the trust profile and trust negotiation. The credential expression, ψ, shown in
Figure 4.3 is the policy that ABAC enforces which involves confidentiality and role.
In our model, as introduced in Defn. 5:, ψ represents the credential expression as in
(Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000). In addition, we also create a set of release actions

RA (Defn. 18) that the controller will perform depending on how ψ is satisfied. RA and ψ
are created dynamically based on the request context the controller receives to ensure that
its requirements for access match the resource being requested and the user’s role. The RA
may detail actions including but not limited to: logging, audit notifications, data redaction,
data addition, or data modification. During trust negotiation, the controller attempts to
minimize the risk present in the transaction by obtaining as many relevant credentials as
possible until all of its requirements have been satisfied. The RA present in the model
allows the controller to ascertain the amount of risk in the transaction and act accordingly
to protect the resource, or otherwise add, modify, or remove access to portions of the
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resource to reduce risk. This approach allows trust negotiation to obtain a higher success
rate without compromising security.

4.3.

Healthcare Example
In this section, we present a healthcare example that describes the interactions

between the user (requestor) and the healthcare organization’s controller involving the use
of the trust profile as trust negotiation credentials, the validation of the trust profile’s
legitimacy, and the dissemination of new trust profile entries. A representation of Dr.
Jane’s current trust profile is shown in the inner box of Figure 4.4. Dr. Jane is a physician
working at Family Health Center (FHC) and has previously obtained access to sensitive
data at St. Francis Hospital (SFH). Her trust profile contains entries from both FHC and
SFH. She possesses two X.509 identity certificates, one from each FHC and SFH displayed
in the upper half of Dr. Jane’s current trust profile in Figure 4.4. Each of the identity
certificates has one or more attribute certificates attached to it, each attribute certificate
describing one specific aspect of access to sensitive data under the physician role. Since
she is an employee of FHC, her access to the EHR of FHC is unrestricted with improper
data access being determined by local RBAC policies and security audits of the EHR’s
access logs. Since Jane is personally known to FHC and has had her personal identity
manually vetted through FHCs hiring process, FHC endorses her trustworthiness by
maintaining a current ACAffiliation certificate present in Jane’s trust profile. Sensitive data from
SFH was previously obtained through successful trust negotiation, resulting in additional
trust profile entries. Jane’s trust profile is stored remotely on trusted FHC servers and
accessed by her security agent when needed for trust negotiation.
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Figure 4.4. Dr. Jane’s Trust Profile.
Jane is seeing her patient at FHC who recently had an EKG taken at the Henry Low
Heart Center at Hartford Hospital (HH) and needs the patient’s updated healthcare record
with the EKG for follow up treatment. Jane has never had previous contact with HH for
healthcare records, and HH has no previous contact with Jane or knowledge of her status
as a physician with FHC. Jane is able to locate her patient’s new EKG data through the use
of a master patient index (MPI) and discovers that HH has a copy of her patient’s EKG.
Through the mHealth application on Jane’s mobile device provided by FHC, Jane makes a
request for trust negotiation to HH’s controller to access her patient’s EKG. The process
of testing trust credentials starts in step 1 and continues in time from top to bottom in Figure
4.5.
Jane initiates a secure connection to HH’s controller and creates an RC. Recall
from Defn. 16: that an RC consists of a data resource DR, the digital wallet tpDW for the
first round of trust negotiation, and the Role r that Jane would like to use to access the
information. Jane builds the RC:
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𝐷𝑅 = < 𝐷𝑅



𝑡𝑝



RC = < DR, tpDW, rfamily physician >

= < 𝐼𝐶

, 𝐷𝑅
, 𝐴𝐶

>
>

Jane’s mobile device communicates with her security agent SARequestor running on a
server maintained by FHC to send the RC, shown in step 1 in the upper left of Figure 4.5.

SARequestor serves the purpose of offloading memory intensive and computationally expensive
cryptographic operations required for trust negotiation from the mobile device as supported
in surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003). Offloading management of trust profile
disclosure to the security agent also improves security, as the trust profile will not be found
on the mobile device in the case that it is lost or stolen. Recall that the security agent is
responsible for managing the disclosure of Jane’s credentials from her trust profile stored
in the cloud. Jane selects a subset of her trust profile that describes her current employment
with FHC under the family physician role. The mHealth application collects the specific
certificates that describe the subset of the trust profile that Dr. Jane has selected and
packages their certificate chains into a digital wallet tpDW. The RC is then sent to the
controller of HH’s EHR, shown in step 2 of Figure 4.5.
HH’s controller’s security agent SAController receives the RC and examines Dr. Jane’s
request to compile an appropriate set of credentials to determine whether Dr. Jane is
trustworthy and should be granted access to the requested patient EKG. This collection of
trust negotiation credentials that the controller requires to release the requested data is
referred to as the credential expression, ψ. The credential expression ψ is generated, shown
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in step 3 of Figure 4.5, based on DRtype and rfamily physician. The controller decides that the
request will be accepted if the requestor possesses the following credentials:


The requestor has at least one credential ACAffiliation indicating current employment and
manual security vetting of the trust profile owner.



The requestor has at least three credentials ACDataResourceConfidentiality N indicating access to
healthcare records of at least sensitivity level N.



The requestor has at least three credentials ACDataResourceAccess where r = physician indicating
record access under the physician role.

Additionally, the request will be considered a lower risk transaction if the requestor
possesses credentials indicating:


The requestor has at least 3 credentials that indicate access to healthcare records of the
patient listed in DRID.



There is at least one credential indicating access to the patient’s healthcare records
within the last year 𝐴𝐶

= 2019.

And the controller’s release actions RA:


If the credential expression is satisfied but the additional requirements are not, the
controller will release the data but will note the transaction in a high risk log and
dispatch a notification to the controller’s auditor that a high-risk transaction has
occurred.



If the credential expression is satisfied but only one of the additional requirements is
met, the transaction is noted in a high risk log but no notification is sent to the auditor.
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If the credential expression is satisfied and both additional requirements are met,
transaction is noted in low risk log.
The controller then begins the validation process for the certificates in the tpDW.

First, the controller requires proof that the sender of the certificates is also the owner of the
certificates and that the entries in the trust profile describe the sender’s access history. The
controller determines ownership by sending a cryptographic challenge, shown in step 4 of
Figure 4.5, encrypted with the public key listed in the associated identity certificates to the
requestor, in this case Dr. Jane. Dr. Jane possesses the private key associated with the
identity certificates, so her SARequestor is able to respond to the cryptographic challenge and
signs the response with the private key before sending it back to the HH controller, shown
in step 5. The HH controller, now satisfied that it is in communication with the trust
profile’s owner, begins the process of validating the information within the certificates
(step 6). First, the controller examines the issuer signature of the leaf identity certificate.
The controller retrieves the public key of the issuer from the next certificate in the chain in
the CA certificate, in this case the signing certificate owned by FHC. The public key is
used to retrieve the hash of the leaf identity certificate in the digital signature signed by
FHC’s CA certificate. The controller computes the hash of the leaf identity certificate and
compares it to the CA’s signed hash. If the hashes match, the controller knows that the data
in the identity certificate is the same data signed by FHC if FHC’s CA certificate is also
valid and unaltered. Validation continues by validating FHC’s CA certificate. The
controller checks if FHC’s CA certificate is in HH’s local trusted certificate store. Since
HH does not trust FHC directly, FHC’s CA certificate is not in the certificate store so
validation of the FHC CA certificate proceeds using the same process. The root medical
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authority’s certificate is retrieved, the signature of the FHC CA certificate is inspected, and
the FHC CA certificate is found to be valid. The root medical authority’s certificate is
found in HH’s local trusted certificate store, so the entire certificate chain is valid and
Jane’s identity certificates have been verified. The attribute certificates are validated with
the same process, in addition to the controller checking to ensure each attribute certificate
is associated with a valid X.509 identity certificate.
The digital wallet released to the controller thus far has only satisfied the affiliation
requirement in the credential expression. The controller sends the SGP to Jane (step 7)
listing remaining necessary credentials, including both those required for access and those
required to consider the transaction low risk. In healthcare, the SGP is crucial to control
access to sensitive medical data on patients by alerting the physician to the access history
in the trust profile that is necessary to access the medical data. Without the SGP, the
physician has no method to determine the type of health record access history the controller
requires. It is necessary to alert the physician to the exact credentials required as the trust
profile can become arbitrarily long and the physician must be able to complete the trust
negotiation attempt quickly. Jane’s trust agent receives the request (step 7). Jane reads the
request (step 8) and decides to release the three latest records of access (step 9) to the
patient’s healthcare record in her trust profile and credentials indicating her confidentiality
level. Her trust agent collects the certificates describing these access records, places them
in a tpDW, and sends them to the HH controller (step 10).


𝐴𝐶 = < 𝐼𝐶

, 𝑑𝑠

, 𝐴𝐶



𝐴𝐶 = < 𝐼𝐶

, 𝑑𝑠

, 𝐴𝐶

, 2020, 𝑢

,𝑟

, 2020, 𝑐𝑙 , 𝑑𝑟

, 𝑑𝑟
, 𝑠𝑦𝑠

, 𝑠𝑦𝑠

>

>
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The controller receives Dr. Jane’s credentials (step 11) and issues its cryptographic
challenge to determine ownership (step 12). The trust agent answers the challenge (step
13). The controller checks that the credentials reference the correct patient, and checks the
timestamps to determine if any of the accesses have occurred within the last year. Since
the subset of Jane’s credentials the controller holds now satisfy all of the controller’s
requirements (step 14), the controller decides to release the requested health data to Jane
and considers the transaction to be low risk. The low risk status allows full data disclosure
and the transaction is logged in a low-risk transaction log, fulfilling the RA requirements.
The controller processes the EKG to be sent to Dr. Jane by converting it to a standard
interchange format and preparing it for transfer using the FHIR standard. HH’s controller
requests that Dr. Jane either send an X.509 identity certificate signed by HH’s controller
or generate a new private/public key pair and send the new public key (step 15). Dr. Jane
doesn’t currently possess an X.509 identity certificate from HH so she generates the new
key pair and sends the public key in a CSR as requested (step 16). HH’s controller receives
the public key and generates a new X.509 certificate, signs it, and creates attribute
certificates describing the current access to the EKG (step 17). HH’s controller then sends
the EKG and the new trust profile entries to Dr. Jane over the secure connection (step 18).
Dr. Jane receives the trust profile entries, adds them to her trust profile, and is now able to
examine the EKG (step 19). The trust negotiation process is now complete and the
connection is terminated. Should Dr. Jane already possess an X.509 identity certificate
from HH, the process remains the same except HH only generates the attribute certificates
and associates them with the already created identity certificate. Dr. Jane’s trust profile
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now encompasses the entire trust profile present in Figure 4.4, including the certificates
issued by HH.

Figure 4.5. Healthcare Example Sequence Diagram.
To illustrate the flexibility of the controller’s requirements, suppose that Jane is
unable to produce a credential indicating previous access of the patient’s health records
because her patient typically sees another physician at the same hospital. In this case, the
controller’s requirements for the data are met, but the transaction is considered by the
controller to be a higher risk because the physician lacks a history indicating treatment of
the patient in the past. The healthcare data is still released to Jane since she has indicated a
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previous history of healthcare data access under the physician role and current affiliation
with a healthcare organization, but since the controller is unable to obtain assurance that
Jane has had past interactions with the patient, the transaction is logged in a high risk audit
log and the controller’s security auditor receives a notification that the high risk transaction
has occurred. This allows Jane timely access to the data with a reasonable level of assurance
that the transaction is appropriate while allowing the auditor to react swiftly to the
transaction if a mistake has occurred.

4.4.

Related Work
The security and flexibility of trust negotiation has resulted in a variety of

adaptations to the healthcare domain and online business, in conjunction with mobile
devices. In (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, & Seamons, 2005), the authors create a
framework for adaptive trust negotiation targeting trust establishment between unknown
users and online businesses through integrating TrustBuilder and the GAA-API. Trust is
established utilizing credentials accumulated through past purchases online, with users
being authorized to make larger purchases online if they are able to present a history of
past successful purchases. Users are assigned a score by the business’ controller based on
both the quantity and dollar amount of past purchases and the score determines whether
the current transaction can be trusted to be fulfilled by the user. The required level of trust
also fluctuates depending on the number of requests received by a single requestor to guard
against slowing the system with a denial-of-service attack composed of repeated failed trust
negotiation attempts. This approach of tracking users’ past purchases is similar to our
approach of accumulating a set of historical access to sensitive healthcare data, which
provides an accumulating set of credentials. Our approach contrasts with this effort by
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allowing for more depth in which credentials are specified, which properties of the
credentials are most relevant, customizing the credential requirements based on the user’s
role, and customizing the controller’s response to a trust negotiation request.
In the healthcare domain, (Mavridis, Georgiadis, Pangalos, & Khair, 2001)
provides a methodology for applying access control to EHR data through the use of
attribute based access control utilizing a certificate system similar to the one presented
here. Unlike our approach where the user possesses the certificates detailing attributes
directly, the authors use an identity based approach. Each user obtains an identity certificate
and is also provided with an appropriate set of short-lived attribute certificates. These
certificates provide credentials that the access control policy reads to determine sensitive
data access, including the concept of a user location defined by: the actual device the user
operates to initiate the request, the user’s administrative domain that determines how it
reacts to the request based on group policies (e.g., different departments within the
hospital), and a context parameter that detects a need-to-know requirement (e.g., physicians
may only read data on patients they have been assigned). Access is based on a tuple
consisting of the user’s role and location, which grants permissions to access a data set
under an access mode. This approach mirrors our approach with regards to the usage of
credentials encoded in identity and attribute certificates but lacks methods of accumulating
credentials over a period of time, which is a key feature of our approach and lacks the
adaptiveness of providing multiple levels of trust which we also offer.
The application of trust negotiation for healthcare was introduced in (Vawdrey,
Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson, 2003). In this paper, the authors describe an EHR capable
of receiving requests for trust negotiation and generating a policy that releases the
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underlying medical data. The controller responds to requests for health data only by
requesting the physician’s medical license which is provided by a medical association.
While our approach is also healthcare focused and depends on the user possessing a
verifiable set of credentials, we have expanded the set of credentials beyond the usage of a
medical license to a complete set of access history in the trust profile. Additionally, the
controller is capable of adapting the security policies to both the type of request and the
requestor.
Surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003) is also provided as a method for
adapting trust negotiation to the healthcare field since healthcare data is often accessed via
mobile device. The more cryptographically intensive functions such as validating
certificates and sending responses to cryptographic challenges are offloaded to a trusted
server provided by the hospital that employs the physician. We have incorporated the
concept of a trust agent introduced in this paper into our model, allowing a trust profile
owner to determine the way that the trust profile is stored. The communication between
the user’s trust agent, which manages trust profile credential disclosure for the user, and
the controller’s trust agent, which manages the controller’s own credential disclosures and
forwards an SGP to the user to communicate which trust profile disclosures are required,
forms the basis for credential disclosure in our approach.
The application for healthcare is further enhanced in (Elkhodr, Shahrestani, &
Cheung, 2011) by creating a trust negotiation protocol for verifying access to remote
healthcare sensors placed in the home of the patient. The Ubiquitous Health Trust Protocol
(UHTP) is created to allow physicians to authorize themselves, the device they use, and
the remote sensors they access to retrieve up to date healthcare data, allowing the patient
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to be monitored continuously from a healthcare professional from the comfort of their own
home. Similar to our approach, the UHTP defines multiple credentials, building trust if the
user is: authenticated with the local EHR, utilizing an approved mobile device, and located
within a certain distance of the remote sensors being accessed. In comparison, our approach
is different in three ways: it is more adaptive and allows multiple levels of trust to be
attained depending on the credentials presented; contains a more expansive set of
credentials consisting of the user’s entire sensitive data access history; and, doesn’t require
traditional username/password authentication that necessitates previous credential
registration.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Adaptive Trust Negotiation Framework
In this chapter, we describe the dynamic adaptive trust negotiation framework that
includes all of the infrastructure that is necessary to design and implement the trust profile
concepts from Chapter 3 and the model of Chapter 4 into a framework to realize trust
negotiation. The discussion of the framework in this chapter supports Contribution D:
Dynamic Adaptive Trust Negotiation Framework by:
1. defining and describing all of the necessary concepts that are required to
implement the model of Chapter 4 using the resource in Defns. 6a and 6b;
2. augmenting the discussion of every concept to customize the discussion of
each concept which essentially constitutes a way that the resource concepts
can be transitioned into FHIR resources; and,
3. illustrating each of the concepts by continuing and extending the example
presented in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4.
The main concepts of the dynamic adaptive trust negotiation framework are:


Security objects (sec objects) that are created based on the data requested,
the trust profile entries required, and the validated trust profile entires
exchanged during trust negotiation that fulfill the trust profile requirements.



Security Metadata that is divided into four concepts: system security
metadata, resource type security metadata, resource security metadata, and
consent metadata..
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Security Object Structure that creates a tree for each Sec object that contains
the specific credentials that must be presented to the controller.



Request Resolution which describes how multiple Sec objects are combined
to ensure security at each identified security level from the four Security
Metadata concepts.



Controller Configuration which describes the way that the controller is
configured to accept certain collections of credentials on a per-role basis.

This chapter consists of 2 sections. Section 5.1 discusses the contents, structure, and useage
of a security object in detail. Section 5.2 discusses the configuration of a security object
and the metadata, specified in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format, required to build
a security object. All of the concepts discussed in both Sections 5.1 and 5.2. support
expected Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies and
Contribution D: Trust Negotiation Development Framework.

5.1.

Security Objects
In this section, we introduce the concept of a security object, Sec object, which acts

as a repository to capture the relationship between the data requested, the trust profile
entries required, and the validated trust profile entries exchanged during trust negotiation
that fulfill the trust profile requirements. Recall from Chapter 4 that the trust profile’s
attribute certificate types track: the associated identity certificate, the attribute certificate
issuer, and a timestamp. The attribute certificate types are: data resource access certificates
(ACDataResourceAccess), affiliation certificates (ACAffiliation), data resource confidentiality certificates
(ACDataResourceConfidentiality), and system confidentiality certificates (ACSystemConfidentiality); see Defns. 14a, 14b,
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14c, and 14d, respectively. The data resource DR of a particular system S requires a set
of access certificates AC that provide metadata on the role the user possessed during the
access, a DRID, and the SID representing system S (e.g., an EHR or a FHIR server in the
healthcare domain) that serviced the originating request. Affiliation certificates denote that
a user is a current employee with a trusted healthcare provider which implies a thorough
manual background check as part of the pre-employment process. The data resource
confidentiality certificate provides the confidentiality level of the resource accessed DRID,
within the system SID. The system confidentiality certificate describes the highest level of
confidentiality that the certificate subject has accessed on the system SName with SID.
The controller (Defn. 3) first receives a request context RC (Defn. 16) consisting of
the requested DR (Defn. 6b), the digital wallet (Defn. 15), and role r (Defn. 8) for trust
profile based trust negotiation. The controller creates one or more Sec objects. Each Sec
object is responsible for matching verified trust profile credentials to security requirements
at a pre-defined security level that corresponds to collections of sensitive data. These
security levels are identified when trust profile support is added to a server’s authentication
and authorization options. The first security level encompasses the entire server, with each
lower security level configured with stricter requirements for a more specific subset of
data. In order to obtain access to the requested object, the requestor’s trust profile entries
must satisfy the requirements of the Sec objects at each level. We define a single Sec object
as being satisfied when a subset of the trust profile credentials shared with the controller
by the requestor R contains the Access History Properties AHP (Defn. 9) with the values
required by the Controller Configuration to be introduced in Section 5.2. Security metadata
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is divided into one of four identified levels, whose various access rules are combined
utilizing the process described in Section 5.1.5 to form one credential expression for the
entire trust negotiation process. Recall from Chapter 2 Section 3 that FHIR categorizes
resources into one of many types of resources. These four security levels are:


System security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.1 refers to the requirements
that the controller must observe in the requestor’s trust profile to gain access to any
resources on S.



Resource type security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.2 refers to the protection
of an individual type of resource.



Resource security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.3 refers to the protection of
an individual resource instance on S and the data within the resource.



Consent metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.4 refers to the ability of a patient to
describe which healthcare providers may access each resource that describes the
patient.

In support of trust profile integration, we have created a front end to a RESTful
implementation to enable the creation of a credential expression, through the creation of
Sec objects, whose access rules are created based on a pre-defined configuration, to be
specified in Section 5.2, and reactive to the requestor’s role and the trust profile entries
received. This metadata describes the properties needed in the requestor’s trust profile to
obtain authorization to a resource on a per-role basis. The modifications support the
creation of an adaptive credential expression that accepts multilple sets of trust profile
credentials that result in multiple levels of trust. Depending on the level of trust established,
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the configuration specifies release actions RA for each set of credentials that may satisfy
the generated credential expression.
Each Sec object is organized into a tree structure as illustrated with the SecResource Type
example in Figure 5.1 detailing the specific credentials that must be presented to the
controller on a per role basis, as well as release actions required for the release of the
resource based on which parts of the credential expression are satisfied. The root of the tree
contains an identifier that defines the type of Sec object, depicted in Figure 5.1 as the
subscript in the purple rectangle on the left side. The SecSystem, SecResource Type, SecResource, and SecConsent
objects protect, respectively, the involved system SID, an identified data resource type

DRType of that system, an associated data resource DRID (e.g., an ID of the patient FHIR
resource), or the consent of the data’s owner (e.g., a patient). A Sec object ID, represented
as the gray oval in the bottom left of Figure 5.1, notes a unique identifier for the actual
instance of the resource being protected (e.g., a system ID, the resource type’s name, a
numeric identifier for the individual resource, etc.). The next level of the tree represented
by the branches connected to the SecResource Type rectangle in Figure 5.1, provides a supported
list of roles capable of retrieving data of the requested Sec object. For example, a SecSystem
object contains a complete listing of all of the roles that are able to access any sensitive
data protected by the controller, whereas SecResource Type for an Observation FHIR resource will
only contain the roles that are capable of accessing a resource of the Observation type.
Each role contains subtrees representing a set of AHPs, shown as green rectangles
connected to the roles in Figure 5.1, that the controller must request from the requestor’s
trust profile to grant access if the requestor is assuming that role. Each role is configured
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with multiple sets of AHPs with differing requirements and release actions. The Sec
object’s security requirements are satisfied if one set of AHPs specified in the configuration
has been matched to the presented trust profile credentials (e.g., the Sec object requires
trust profile credentials noting access to the patient’s record within the last year, and a trust
profile credential indicating access to the patient’s record within the last year is presented).
The existence of multiple sets of AHPs allows more flexibility in the ability to build trust
between the requestor and controller by requesting multiple combinations of AHPs, which
provides a baseline for AHPs that must be present for the controller to trust the requestor
with the release of the requested resource object.
Each set of AHPs has an optional set of release actions (RAs) represented by the
blue rectangles attached to the AHPs that describes ancillary actions the controller must
take to approve the satisfaction of the AHP requirement by a credential in the requestor’s
trust profile. The RA for an AHP optionally has: potential additions, modifications, or
redactions of the resource before release to the requestor; or specifies side effect actions
such as noting the release of the resource at certain risk levels in a multi-level audit log and
dispatching audit notifications to the healthcare organization’s local security auditor for
immediate review. Additions to the resource include contextual data not requested but
necessary to understand the resource, e.g., a program for reading X-Ray scans.
Modifications to the resource include changes such as translating embedded data into a
standard format. Redactions may occur if the requestor’s credentials meet a trust level
sufficient to access parts of a resource, but not the entire resource. In this case, the sensitive
data is redacted, allowing the requestor to obtain the subset of useful data that the requestor
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is authorized to access. Integrating an RA into a resource is a method that the controller
uses to increase the rate of trust negotiation success and disseminate requested PHI without
compromising patient security. The remainder of this section consists of Sections 5.1.1 to
5.1.5, which correspond to the concepts: System Security metadata, Resource Type
Security metadata, Resource Security metadata, Consent metadata, and Request
Resolution.

Figure 5.1. SecResource Type Object Example Structure.
5.1.1.

System Security Metadata

System security (SecSystem) metadata refers to the requirements the controller must
observe in the requestor’s trust profile to gain access to any resources protected by the
system. This may include a valid affiliation certificate (Defn. 14b) denoting current
employment at a trusted healthcare provider and at least one data resource access certificate
(Defn. 14a) describing access to a resource under the role requested for the current trust
negotiation. System security also encompasses the overall highest security clearance the
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user has been granted on a specific system. As specified in the trust profile model, an
identity certificate in a trust profile may have a system confidentiality attribute certificate
(Defn. 14d) attached to it that records the highest security clearance previously granted to
the trust profile owner by the specific system that signed it. This certificate is replaced with
a newer certificate listing a higher clearance in the event that the controller grants the
requestor access to a resource with a higher listed security clearance than the clearance
listed in the requestor’s system confidentiality attribute certificate. The requestor may be
assigned higher security clearances by the controller depending on which trust profile
entries the requestor sends to satisfy the generated credential expression. An ACSystemConfidentiality
certificate previously digitally signed by the controller may be provided during negotiation
to claim a previous confidentiality level assigned by the controller. A system
confidentiality level may be assigned based on the perceived damage caused by a potential
unauthorized leak of the requested data. A requestor that meets the confidentiality
requirements for portions of the requested resource, but not the entire resource, may result
in a release action (RA) (Defn. 18) that causes the controller to filter data of higher
sensitivity from the resource before sending it to the requestor.
The system security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation in a
number of steps. SecSystem represents the base requirements for any request made to the HAPI
FHIR server. When trust negotiation with a HAPI FHIR instance is requested, the SecSystem
object is created based on the role the user chooses to represent the set of trust profile
requirements to access the HAPI FHIR API. Any request to the HAPI FHIR instance that
does not satisfy the SecSystem object is unable to retrieve any healthcare data from the
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underlying EHR. Figure 5.2 shows an example configuration of a SecSystem object for the
Primary Care Physician, Nurse, and Accident and Emergency doctor roles. These
configurations require that each role has a current affiliation certificate (Defn. 14b).
Additionally, with no other credentials or overrides from the other Sec objects, the request
would be logged as a high risk transaction and an audit notification would be dispatched to
the auditor account located at “security@bmi9.engr.uconn.edu”.

Figure 5.2. An Example SecSystem Configuration.
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5.1.2.

Resource Type Security Metadata

Resource type security (SecResource Type) metadata refers to the protection of all of the
resources of a given type (e.g. resource types in the FHIR standard, which are further
divided into foundation, base, clinical, financial, and specialized resource types (HL7
International, 2019)). Each resource type possesses an associated security object that
describes the credentials that must be presented by the requestor for the controller to release
a resource of the given type. The required credentials are described by a series of Access
History Properties (AHP), each describes a single property of access to a sensitive resource.
These credentials are also organized within the security object by the role the requestor
assumes for the given trust negotiation transaction. Recall that (Sanzi et al., 2017) specifies
that in the initial request for trust profile based trust negotiation, the requestor specifies the
role (e.g., family physician, emergency room physician, nurse, billing agent, front desk
secretary, etc.) to be assumed for the purposes of negotiation. The controller filters the
resources a requestor of a given role accesses based on the perceived needs of a role. For
example, a physician role will be allowed to access clinical resources (e.g., summary,
diagnostics, medications, care provisions, request and responses) whereas a front desk
secretary may be limited to the patient resource (describing the patient’s demographic data)
under the base category. The role specified by the requestor will also affect the proof the
controller requests for assurance of the requestor’s membership of the specified role. A
family physician requesting a patient’s clinical resources may be asked to provide
credentials from the trust profile indicating a historical access to the patient’s clinical
resources whereas a front desk secretary may only have to provide proof of employment
(affiliation) via a desk secretary role to access a patient’s demographic data.
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The resource type security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a
front end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation in
a number of steps. SecResource Type represents the requirements to access an object of the requested
type from the HAPI FHIR instance. If the requestor were to request a FHIR Observation
resource from the controller, the controller retrieves a SecResource

Type

for the Observation

resource that contains the set of Access History Properties required in the trust profile to
obtain access to any resource of an Observation type. If a requestor wishes to retrieve an
Observation resource, at this level the requestor must: satisfy the SecSystem for HAPI FHIR
API access and satisfy the SecResource Type for Observation resource access. Figure 5.3 shows an
example SecResource Type configuration for a SecResource Type object for an Observation resource. The
displayed role, for the physician, is required to show a current affiliation (Defn. 14b) as
well as satisfy one of the two sets of properties noted under the “properties” array. Note
that more roles are listed at this level in the JSON structure in Figure 5.3 in the same manner
as in Figure 5.2 but are omitted for brevity. The physician’s properties array contains two
AHP (Defn. 9) sets: one at the top whose satisfaction results in a high amount of trust, and
one at the bottom whose satisfaction results in a mid level of trust. The high trust AHP set
requires 3 (quantity property) trust profile entries within 3 years of the current date (period
property), with the role of physician (role property), with the patient’s ID for those trust
profile entries matching the one for the Observation (patient property), and the trust profile
entries must be Observations (resource-type property) with a clearance of TS (resourceclearance property). Should all of these requirements be met by the presented trust profile,
the requestor gains a high level of trust, the transaction does not require an audit, and the
transaction is logged as a low risk (release-actions property). Conversely, the mid-level
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trust AHP set only requires one entry within the last year, with the patient’s ID, only
requires access to the Patient resource (containing patient demographics), requires only a
resource-clearance of S, and results in logging the transaction as a mid level risk.

Figure 5.3. An Example SecResource Type Configuration.
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5.1.3.

Resource Security Metadata

Resource security (SecResource) metadata protects an individual resource object on the
a server and the data within the object. The resource SecResource provides security data for is
identified within the SecResource by a matching the identifier presented in the Data Resource
(Defn. 6b) of the Request Context (Defn. 16). SecResource is similar to SecResource Type with the
exception that it protects an individual resource instance as contrasted to an entire
collection of resources of a certain type, increasing the granularity with which a resource
is protected. When the request for a resource through trust negotiation is first received by
the controller, the SecResource object attached to the requested object is retrieved by matching
the object’s ID to the SecResource ID.
The resource security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. SecResource
represents the requirements to access the specific FHIR resource object identified in the
initial data request. The SecResource is retrieved via a FHIR ID and provides security for an
individual FHIR resource instance. When a requestor requests a resource, at this level the
requestor must satisfy: the SecSystem for HAPI FHIR API access, the SecResource Type for Observation
resource access, and the SecResource object for access to the specific resource requested. Figure
5.4 shows an example configuration for a specific Observation resource, identified by the
EHR using the FHIR URL to access the Observation with an ID of 25.
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Figure 5.4. An Example SecResource Configuration.
5.1.4.

Consent Security Metadata

Consent security (SecConsent) metadata allows for a data owner to provide input as to
which requestors may access each resource owned. A SecConsent is retrieved during trust
negotiation by matching the ID of the owner described by the resource with the ID of the

SecConsent object. Additionally, a SecConsent object provides support for listing an arbitrary list of
trust profile identity certificates whose owners can access the object regardless of the
requirements listed in the Consent object. This allows explicit access to the object should
the data owner know of a user that should be able to access the object, even if the
organization maintaining the controller does not. Identity certificates are uniquely
identified by a combination of issuer and serial number, and a public key must be listed for
the requestor to authenticate to.
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The consent security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. A SecConsent
of type Patient allows the patient whose medical data is described by the requested resource
to have input as to which healthcare providers may access the resource. Our SecConsent security
object is based on the principles of patient consent (The Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information Technology, 2019) outlined by The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC). Patient consent methods allow
patients to consent to HIE among multiple healthcare providers by allowing patients to note
when and how their health data is shared whether their health data is shared for treatment,
bill payment, or general healthcare operations. Our patient consent object can override
other security objects when present, allowing the patient to have final authority over the
disclosure of the health record. The SecConsent object is built by the patient and attached to the
patient’s records within a FHIR system, allowing the patient to provide input as to which
trust profile credentials are necessary during trust negotiation for the release of the patient’s
FHIR resources.
The patient interacts with the SecConsent object via a patient portal provided by the
healthcare organization maintaining the FHIR server. The patient portal follows the ONC’s
meaningful consent guidelines (The Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, 2018) and describes the patient’s choices as well as the
implication of their options regarding what data will be released to which types of providers
under different circumstances. The patient portal interface provided by the healthcare
organization presents multiple options that cover different use cases along with
descriptions for which healthcare providers have access to the patient’s FHIR resources
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depending on the options chosen. This simplifies the selection process for a patient,
allowing the patient to fully comprehend the implications of each choice without requiring
a deep understanding of trust profiles or trust negotiation. At the healthcare provider’s
discretion, more granular interfaces can be made available to the patient should the patient
have the knowledge to construct more detailed SecConsent objects. The SecConsent object contains
the same format as the SecResource and SecResource Type objects with the restriction that a SecConsent object
is only attached to a FHIR resource via ID if the resource’s patient identifier matches the
identifier of the patient creating the SecConsent object. Additionally, the patient may include
multiple instances of a healthcare professional’s public key from a trust profile identity
certificate. This allows the patient to identify a healthcare professional as being able to
access the patient’s healthcare records if the patient has a pre-existing relationship. If an
identity certificate is listed as a potential credential to gain access to a FHIR resource, the
healthcare professional attempting to access the resource proves ownership of the public
key by proving ownership of the associated private key. This is done by digitally signing a
message with the private key during trust negotiation in accordance with public key
infrastructure. This feature allows patients to name specific healthcare workers that should
be able to access their records, such as in the case of being treated by multiple physicians
known to the patient, each providing one specific aspect of treatment.
Figure 5.5 shows an example SecConsent configuration that belongs to a patient with an
ID of 13. Although the patient has not specified any AHP sets, the patient has explicitly
allowed a physician with the matching certificate listed in the “direct-consent” object to
access any healthcare record that describes the patient. The physician can satisfy the SecConsent
object with this configuration by presenting the certificate with the specified issuer and
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serial number and responding to a cryptographic challenge constructed with the listed
public key. A successful response indicates that the requestor owns the listed identity
certificate. This allows patients to formally specify their own physicians or other healthcare
professionals as having access to their healthcare records. Although the properties list is
empty in this example, patients can specify constraints on their healthcare data by requiring
trust profile entries utilizing the same format for the properties objects as in the examples
listed in Figures 5.2 through 5.4.

Figure 5.5. An Example SecConsent Configuration.
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5.1.5.

Request Resolution

Conceptually, each AHP listed in a Sec object represents an entry required to exist
in the requestor’s trust profile that proves successful, secure handling of the type of Sec
object by the role. The healthcare organization that shares the PHI is responsible for
determining the AHPs necessary to determine whether a requestor is trustworthy. A
requestor making a request under a family physician role for their patient’s EHR data
located at a remote healthcare organization could result in the following requested AHPs
and RAs:


SecSystem: Affiliation with any healthcare provider (RA: log as high risk).



SecResource Type: Past access to a resource of the same type within the last year ( RA: reduce log

level to medium risk, redact resource data with sensitivity: S or higher).


SecResource: Optional: Past access to a resource belonging to the patient within the last two
years (RA: reduce log level to low risk, audit notification not required, no redaction
required).



SecConsent: Affiliation with a listed healthcare provider (RA: notify patient of access through
a healthcare portal).

The request resolution of the framework can be integrated through a front end into FHIR
resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. The Sec object structure
identifiers and AHP sets represent resources in the FHIR standard. The SecSystem identifier is
the FHIR RESTful URL where trust negotiation is initiated with the controller. The SecResource
Type

identifier is a FHIR resource category such as an Observation, Patient, or
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MedicationStatement. The SecResource identifier is a FHIR ID that uniquely identifies the FHIR
resource. The SecConsent identifier is the ID of the patient whose healthcare data is represented
by the FHIR object. AHP (Defn. 9) sets describe trust profile entries noting access to
sensitive healthcare data, such as the type of data accessed, when the data was accessed,
and the specific patient whose data was accessed.
When a request for trust negotiation is initially received, the controller first retrieves
the metadata utilizing the Request Context (Defn. 16) for each of the four Sec objects that
will be associated with the request: the system metadata for the FHIR installation as a
whole, the resource type metadata for the type of resource being requested (Defn. 6a), the
resource metadata identified by the data resource request (Defn. 6b), and, the consent
metadata associated with the data owner. Each Sec object’s requirements constructed
through the retrieved metadata must be satisfied by one or more credentials sent by the
requestor to determine the requestor’s trustworthiness. When the controller receives a
requestor’s trust profile credential and has finished verifying the credential’s authenticity,
an attempt is made to match it against the AHPs in each of the four retrieved Sec objects.
The controller records which of the AHPs has been satisfied, and creates an SGP based on
which AHPs remain unsatisfied to send back to the requestor. All of the four Sec objects
must be satisfied for the trust negotiation to be successful. A Sec object is satisfied if one
of its AHP sets is satisfied. A single trust profile credential is potentially capable of
satisfying multiple AHPs across multiple Sec objects. During credential exchange, the
controller is continually checking the requestor’s credentials and matching them to the Sec
objects until all of the AHPs are satisfied or the requestor chooses not to send another
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credential. If the requestor chooses not to send another credential, the controller checks
whether all of the four Sec objects are satisfied, executes the release actions, and provides
the resource and new trust profile credentials. The controller’s final set of release actions
are resolved hierarchically from SecSystem to SecResource by beginning with the SecSystem set of release
actions and combining with SecResource Type release actions, then SecResource release actions. When
two RAs conflict at different levels, the RA at the lowest level (closest to the individual
resource) takes precedence. The SecConsent release actions are separated from the other three
Sec objects and are always executed as specified by the data’s owner. The consent object
concerns data owner notifications but may also filter access to the data owner’s resources
more strictly or release resources more freely to specific organizations and thus override
the other three Sec objects. Within a single Sec object, each AHP contains a ranking, with
higher ranking determining which RA is executed if there is a conflict between two RAs in
two satisfied AHPs.
These last aspects of the framework can be integrated through a front end into
FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. The SecSystem object
is mapped to the FHIR instance, the SecResourceType object is mapped to the FHIR resource
type (e.g., Observation, MedicationStatement, Procedure, etc.), the SecResource object is
mapped to the individual FHIR resource instance (e.g., a single resource instance of the
Observation type), and the SecConsent object is mapped to the Patient whose healtchare data is
described by the requested resource. The evaluation of the four Sec objects is resolved
utilizing the generalized method above, by evaluating the satisfaction of the Sec objects
starting with the SecSystem for the FHIR instance, then evaluating the SecResource Type for the resource
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type, then the SecResource for the resource, ending with the SecConsent object for the patient. The
specified release actions for the AHP set that satisfied the Sec object are combined in this
order and resolved via security level (FHIR server instance ranking lowest and patient
consent ranking highest).

5.2.

Controller Configuration
This section describes the configuration of a controller to allow for dynamic

creation of Sec objects depending on the user’s role and resources requested in the Request
Context (Defn. 16). Configurations are created utilizing a specialized JSON specification
capable of defining multiple dynamic AHP sets for each role and multiple roles for each
Sec object. The first part of a JSON schema for configuring a Sec object integrated with
the FHIR standard is shown in Figure 5.6. Each Sec object follows the structure defined in
the schema to express the trust profile requirements on a per role basis. The root of the
object, shown in the top of Figure 5.6 contains the Sec object’s type identifier, which can
take the values “system” for a SecSystem object, “type” for a SecResource Type object, “resource” for a

SecResource object, or “consent” for a SecConsent object. The id field is dependent on the type and
displays the appropriate ID for a System, Resource Type, Resource, or Owner. The ID for
a system consists of the domain name of the system (e.g., bmi9.engr.uconn.edu), The ID
for a Resource Type is the name of the Resource Type (e.g., Observation, Patient,
MedicationStatement, etc.), the ID for a DRID is the unique numeric identifier for the
resource, and the ID for an Owner is a unique numeric identifier for the Owner. Example
IDs for each Sec object type are displayed in Figures 5.2 through 5.4.
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Figure 5.6. JSON Specification for Sec Object Configuration Part 1.
The role 1, role 2, and role n fields represent codes for the roles required for
satisfaction of the Sec object. Each role is provided an identifier allowing easy extraction
of the role from the config. For FHIR integration, the role codes utilize the US Core
CareTeam Provider roles (HL7 International, 2019) compiled from the NUCC Health Care
Provider Taxonomy Code Set (NUCC, 2020) and SNOMED CT (SNOMED International,
2020). Each role contains a requirement object that encapsulates the requirements for the
role. If a role is not specified by the configuration, the Sec object cannot be satisfied by
that role. The requirements field contains three entries, the affiliation entry which is an
instance of a property, the properties entry, which is a list of property instances, and the
direct-consent entry, which is a list of direct-consent instances. The affiliation entry allows
the specification of the requirements for an ACAffiliation certificate through the property object.
The properties field allows the specification of an array of sets of AHPs, the satisfaction of
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one being sufficient for satisfying the Sec object. The direct-consent supports the addition
of a trust profile identity certificate, whose proven owner automatically satisfies the
requirements of the Sec object.
The property field specifies the AHPs necessary for satisfaction of the Sec object,
as well as a meta-property quantity that specifies the number of trust profile entries that
must have those AHPs. The crud field specifies the CRUD operations (create, read, update,
delete) that the requestor may perform if that property set is satisfied by the trust profile.
The period field specifies a range that the trust profile entry’s timestamp must fall within
to satisfy the Sec object. The period field allows for expression as a date range or a relative
time, either from a specified time until the present or before a specified time. The role field
specifies the role that the requestor must have assumed at the time of access and is specified
as a role code from the US Core CareTeam Provider roles. The owner field specifies the
owner of the data in the noted access was, either identified explicitly by ID, or it can have
the value “request_id”, in which case the ID in the trust profile access must be the same as
the ID of the owner of the resource specified in the RC. The resource-type field specifies
the type of resource the trust profile entry must describe. For FHIR integration, this
resource-type would describe a FHIR resource type, such as an Observation, Patient, or
MedicationStatement. Resource-clearance and system-clearance refer to the clearances of
the requested object matched with clearances listed in ACDataResourceConfidentiality and ACSystemConfidentiality
certificates. The clearance listed in the trust profile must meet or exceed the clearance listed
in the configuration to satisfy resource-clearance and system-clearance. The system-id
specifies an ID in the same format as the SecSystem ID (trust negotiation endpoint URL). The
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release-actions field specifies a list of release actions that are performed if the Sec object
is satisfied by that AHP set.
A direct-consent object provides the fields necessary for uniquely identifying and
verifying the ownership of an individual trust profile identity certificate. It contains a crud
property for specifying the CRUD operations a requestor is allowed to perform if the
direct-consent object is satisfied. The trust profile identity certificate is uniquely identified
through the issuer field and the serial field. The issuer must be the string representation of
the identity certificate issuer’s distinguished name, in the order it appears in the certificate.
The public-key property defines a public-key object that has the properties necessary to
parse the recorded public key. The displayed public key must use the “rsaEncryption”
algorithm, though support for additional encryption algorithms is possible.
Figure 5.7 shows the remainder of the JSON specification that supports the fields
in Figure 5.6. The release-actions field provides a log object specifying the level of logging
depending on the level of risk of releasing the requested data, which is dependent on the
amount of trust the requestor’s trust profile credentials create. A set of strict requirements
that generates a large amount of trust would create a low amount of risk, allowing the
transaction to be logged as a low risk, specified with the “low” value for the log object.
The audit field specifies whether the transaction must be accompanied by a notification to
the local auditor, which carries either a string value representing the auditor’s email, or a
null indicating that an immediate audit is unnecessary. The redact and modify fields are a
list of mod-pair objects that describe how the returned resource should be redacted or
modified by specifying individual fields and their new values. The add field specifies a list
of download-urls the requestor utilizes to download the required additional data
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automatically through the client implementation. The period fields specify the period that
the timestamp listed in the trust profile for a data access entry must fall within. Specifying
both from and to fields with a date causes the period to evalutate the timestamp as needing
to fall between the dates listed in the to and from fields. If the from field is null, the
timestamp in the presented trust profile credential must be before the date listed in the to
field inclusive. If the to field is null, the timestamp must be after the date listed in from up
to the present time. Both fields cannot be null or the period is invalid. A date object contains
a type field which specifies if the date is to be interpreted as “literal”, “relative”, or
“current”. A type of “literal” indicates that the value field, specified in yyyy-MM-dd
format, should be parsed as a yyyy-MM-dd date. A type of “relative” indicates that the
value field should be an int, indicating that the date should be interpreted as being value
units in the past, where the units are specified by the unit field, which may take on the
values specified in time-value. A date type of current indicates that the Sec object should
utilize the current time at the time of Sec object creation.
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Figure 5.7. JSON Specification for Sec Object Configuration Part 2.
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Chapter 6
CT2 Prototype
This chapter describes in depth the integration of trust profiles and trust negotiation
into the Connecticut Concussion Tracker CT2 app. Trust negotiation support for the CT2
app is implemented through the combination of four components. The first component is
the modified CT2 mobile Android app, written in Java and supported by the Bouncy Castle
cryptographic library, that allows for authorization to individual student concussion
records through the trust profile. The second component is the Trust Negotiation Certificate
Manager and GUI, which was written in Java, that manages and creates certificates and a
certificate tree for testing, where the root consists of self-signed medical authorities, the
internal nodes consist of CA certificates for healthcare organizations, and the leaves consist
of identity certificates and attribute certificates that encode trust profile data. The third
component is a trust profile supporting trust negotiation controller written in Java that:
manages the connection with the CT2 app; oversees the validation of the trust profile
certificates and their certificate chains; and, generates new trust profile credentials for a
successful trust negotiation. The fourth component is a back-end certificate matching
component that: parses the Sec object configuration; receives validated trust profile
credentials; matches the validated credentials to the Sec object requirements; and, produces
SGPs when the Sec objects have not been fully satisfied. These four components work with
the existing, unmodified CT2 back-end infrastructure (database and RESTful API).
The remainder of this chapter consists of 3 sections. Section 6.1 discusses the CT 2
app and the modifications made to support trust profiles and trust negotiation. Section 6.2
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shows the certificate organizer utilized to generate the initial trust profile credentials for
the users. Section 6.3 concludes the chapter with a detailed description of the controller.
All of the concepts discussed in Sections 6.1 to 6.3 support expected Contribution C:
Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies and Contribution D: Trust
Negotiation Development Framework.

6.1.

Modified CT2 App
The CT2 app discussed in Section 2.3, shown in Figure 6.1 has been modified to

support trust profiles and trust negotiation when viewing a student’s concussion data. The
initial trust profile certificates are located on the device and accessible to the CT 2 app. The
trust negotiation prototype app allows the viewing of a listing of students with concussion
data in the remote concussion database. The CT 2 app has an architecture that utilizes a
RESTful API as the back-end, as shown in Figure 6.2 which has been adapted from (Rivera
Sánchez, A Configurable Framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Mobile Applications,
2017). Notice that the architecture is back ended by the concussion database which is used
to store the information on concussions in the bottom of Figure 6.2. The trust negotiation
process will involve providing access to the concussion resources based on the trust profile
of individual users.
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Figure 6.1. The CT2 Application Screens.
The user can retrieve the open concussion cases or search for a student by first and
last name as shown in Screen 2 over the first row in Figure 6.1. The results list, shown in
Screen 3 of the first row in Figure 6.1, is then used to select the student whose concussion
data the user wishes to view. Accessing an individual concussion case will require the
ability to access a subset of the concussion resources, which correspond to the data
resources DR in our model. When the user selects the student’s name, the app prompts
with a notification that trust negotiation will be required and displays the screen shown in
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Figure 6.3. The app automatically creates a Request Context RC by adding the role of the
user’s CT2 account and displays a list of trust profile certificates for the user to add to the
trust profile tpDW, with the Data Resource DR already filled out automatically by the app
based on the student’s concussion data previously chosen by the user. In this instance, the
resource in the DR is the concussion record for the previously chosen student. Pressing the
send button after choosing the trust profile certificates sends the RC to the Trust Negotiation
Controller, to be detailed in Section 6.3.

Figure 6.2. The CT2 Architecture.

115

The Trust Negotiation Controller receives the RC from the app, processes as
described in Section 6.3, and determines whether the certificates chosen by the user are
sufficient to obtain access to the requested concussion data. If the tp DW from the RC is
insufficient, the CT2 app receives an SGP from the controller. This SGP is displayed in
Figure 6.4. The SGP provides a description to the user of the remaining unsatisfied
requirements of the controller’s generated Sec objects allowing the user to choose trust
profile credentials that fulfill the controller’s requirements. Once the user chooses the trust
profile credentials and sends them to the controller, the process continues until the trust
negotiation controller’s trust profile requirements are satisfied. Once the presented trust
profile credentials are sufficient to satisfy the controller’s trust profile requirements, the
controller forwards new certificates detailing access to the student’s concussion data. These
trust profile credentials are automatically added to the user’s trust profile credentials
located on the device and will appear in the user’s trust profile credentials listing, allowing
those credentials to be utilized in future trust negotiation attempts. On a successful trust
negotiation, the requested concussion data is sent to the CT 2 app, which can then display
the requested concussion data for the student as shown in Figure 6.5. If the user cannot
supply sufficient credentials to obtain access to the requested concussion data, the
connection to the trust negotiation server is closed and the app displays a failure message
to the user, shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.3. The Build Request Context Screen.
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Figure 6.4. The Server Governance Policy Screen.
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Figure 6.5. Concussion Data Received.
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Figure 6.6. The Trust Negotiation Failure Screen.
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6.2.

Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager
The Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager GUI is shown in Figure 6.7. The

Certificate Manager contains three main views: the Certificate Authorities View, which
shows all organizations capable of signing a valid certificate; the Identity Certificates View,
which lists all X.509 identity certificates belonging to a user and signed by the highlighted
certificate in the Certificate Authorities View; and, the Attribute Certificates View, which
lists all the Attribute Certificates belonging to the user whose identity certificate is selected
in the Identity Certificates View. The manager is configured to check a configured folder
and its subfolders for the presence of certificates and organizes all of the certificates into
an interal tree structure starting at the root, self-signed certificates down to the attribute
certificates, where the parent of each certificate is the certificate that signed it. Attribute
certificates are attached as children to the identity certificate they are attached to by
issuer/serial number combination.
The Certificate Authorities’ View displays all of the certificate authority certificates
organized into a tree view, where the child certificates in the lower branches of the tree are
signed by its parent certificate. All of the certificates within this view represent an authority
like the medical authority or an organization that participates in trust profile based trust
negotiation. When a certificate is selected in the Certificate Authorities View, the subject
common name, issuer common name, and serial number of the certificate appear in the
fields directly below the Certificate Authorities View. Certificate authority certificates are
created through OpenSSL (OpenSSL Software Foundation, 2018) and must be added to
the folder that the GUI is configured to search.
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Figure 6.7. The Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager Interface.
The Identity Certificates View contains a listing of all of the identity certificates
that were signed by the selected certificate in the Certificate Authorities View. These
identity certificates are listed by the common name of the subject’s distinguished name
field. When an identity certificate is selected, the Identity Certificates View lists the
identity certificate’s subject common name, the identity certificate’s issuer common name,
and the identity certificate’s serial number below the Identity certificate listing. The button
panel at the bottom of the Identity Certificates’ View provides Create, Lock, and Delete
buttons, adding functionality for creating and deleting identity certificates, as well as
featuring a Lock on the Identity Certificate selection. The Lock functionality is utilized in
Attribute Certificate selection and will be detailed during the Attribute Certificates View
description. When the create button is pressed and the user has previously selected a
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certificate in the Certificate Authorities View, a prompt appears, shown in Figure 6.8, that
displays the distinguished name of the issuer and provides text fields to enter the
distinguished name of the subject. Once the Create button in the prompt is pressed, the
Certificate Manager retrieves the private key of the selected certificate authority certificate,
signs a new identity certificate, and places it in the signed folder of the selected certificate
authority. The delete button removes the certificate file from the file system.
The Attribute Certificates View displays a list of all attribute certificates belonging
to the selected certificate in the Identity Certificates View. When an Attribute Certificate
is selected, the common name of the parent identity certificate, the common name of the
attribute certificate issuer, and the serial number of the attribute certificate are displayed in
the text fields below the attribute certificate listing. The buttons below the text fields feature
Create, Edit, and Delete corresponding respectively with attribute certificate creation,
editing, and deletion. Note that since the attribute certificate is cryptographically signed,
editing results in deleting the old attribute certificate and creating a new attribute certificate
with the given values. The edit screen is shown in Figure 6.9. If the ASN.1 button is
pressed, the screen in Figure 6.10 appears showing the certificate in ASN.1 encoded form,
which can be copied into an ASN.1 decoder to verify the contents of the attribute
certificate. When the create button is pressed, a prompt appears with a dropdown for
specifying which type of AC (Defns. 14a, 14b, 14c, and 14d in Chapter 4, Section 4.2) to
create. When selected, a prompt appears with the relevant, editable fields for that type of
certificate. Confirming the data results in the Certificate Manager creating and saving a
new attribute certificate, whose parent is the highlighted identity certificate in the Identity
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Certificates View, and whose issuer is the selected certificate in the Certificate Authorities
View.

Figure 6.8. The Create Identity Certificate Interface.

To improve usability and ease of finding and reading certificates, the view of the
certificate listing to the right automatically updates with a listing of child certificates when
a certificate is selected in the certificate view to the left. For example, when a certificate is
selected in the Certificate Authorities View, the Identity Certificates View is updated with
a listing of all of the identity certificates signed by that certificate. Additionally, when an
identity certificate is selected, the Attribute Certificates View is updated with a list of all
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attribute certificates attached to the identity certificate. In order to simulate a controller
with separate attribute authorities and certificate authorities, as is required by Section 4.5
of RFC 5755 (Farrell, S et al., 2010), the Lock button functionality of the Identity
Certificate freezes the Identity Certificate View, allowing a certificate from the Certificate
Authority View to be selected without the current identity certificate being deselected. This
lets a separate attribute authority certificate that hasn’t signed the identity certificate to be
selected for attribute certificate signing.

Figure 6.9. The Attribute Certificate Edit Screen.
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Figure 6.10. The ASN.1 Display.

6.3.

Trust Negotiation Controller
The trust negotiation controller is written in Java, utilizing Apache Struts (The

Apache Software Foundation, 2018) for the web interface and Bouncy Castle (Legion of
the Bouncy Castle Inc., 2013) for certificate parsing and generation, both running on an
Apache Tomcat (The Apache Software Foundation, 2020) server. The trust negotiation
controller consists of two components. The first is a component that: manages the
connection with the modified CT2 app; negotiates the release of credentials; validates the
certificates presented by the requestor (X.509 digital signature inspection, certificate chain
validation, and certificate revocation list checking); and, generates new credentials if trust
negotiation is successful. The second component receives validated certificate chains,
parses the Sec object JSON configurations from Chapter 5.2, generates a Sec object for
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each of the four security levels (system, resource type, resource, and consent), and attempts
to match the attributes for each shared certificate with the requirements it parses from the
Sec object configurations.
The first component operates a Struts server that receives the initial request and
request context RC from the modified CT2 app via the RESTful Trust Negotiation API. The
request is directed at the struts server’s /trustnegotiation/ endpoint. When the initial
concussion request context is received, the requestor’s role, the Resource Type, the
Resource ID, and the Patient ID are extracted. The RC is extracted and the trust negotiation
server retrieves the user’s requested role, the DR, and the tpDW through its certificate upload
URL. The trust negotiation server checks to make sure that the resource at the URL matches
the requested resource in the RC and performs validation on the certificates in the tp DW
utilizing the process discussed in Chapter 2.1 following the X.509 standard’s description
of certificate validation. The resource request and any uploaded attribute certificates are
then passed to the second component to begin matching the trust profile credentials
encoded in the certificates to the security requirements in the Sec object configuration.
The second component receives the requested role, Resource Type, Resource ID,
and Patient ID and makes a request to the local MySQL database housing the Sec object
configurations for the configurations needed for the current request. The SecSystem
configuration is retrieved utilizing the local SID, in this case bmi9.engr.uconn.edu, SecResource
Type

noted in the RC , the SecResource noted in the RC, and SecConsent is retrieved from the database

from the Patient ID in the RC. A new Sec object Java instance is created for each Sec
configuration with the JSON configuration utilized to communicate the trust profile entries
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that must be present to satisfy a Sec object. When it receives new certificates, the
certificates are placed into a tree structure that groups the certificates based on the System
S that the access took place on and by the actual access that occurred. The new certificates
are matched against each of the AHP sets in each of the Sec object instances, being added
to a set of certificates that records when an access for sensitive data satisfies the properties
of a Sec object. After the new certificates have been processed, each Sec object is queried
to produce an SGP if the certificates presented thus far have not satisfied its requirements.
The resulting SGPs are returned to the first component, which returns the SGP to the CT 2
app, resulting in a prompt to the requestor to produce trust profile credentials that satisfy
the SGPs.
This process of communication and credential exchange between the CT 2 app and
the trust negotiation controller continues until each of the Sec objects are satisfied or until
the requestor chooses to end trust negotiation without obtaining the requested data. When
each of the Sec objects are queried for SGPs and each return a response indicating that they
are fully satisfied, the new attribute certificates describing the access to the requested
resource are created. The trust negotiation controller then contacts the concussion app
backend through its RESTful API and makes a request for the data originally requested.
The release actions for the satisifed AHPs are compiled and executed in accordance with
Chapter 5.1.5, including logging the transactions at the levels listed in the Sec objects
compiled through the RAs. The list of download URLs for the new certificates and the
requested data are passed back to the CT2 app, which automatically downloads the new
certificates to the user’s trust profile and displays the requested data to the user, as shown
in Figure 6.5. The connection between the app and the controller is then terminated.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation presented and explained a method of authorization between two
entities that have no pre-existing relationship utilizing trust negotiation (Winsborough,
Seamons, & Jones, 2000) in conjunction with the trust profile introduced in this dissertation
to securely exchange credentials based on the trust profile owner’s access history of
sensitive healthcare data. A combination of ABAC (Hu, et al., 2014) to allow flexibility in
the EHR environment for different combinations of credentials, RBAC (Ferraiolo, Sandhu,
Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001) to properly model current localized methods of
access control in an EHR envornment and to inform the trust negotiation controls as to a
proper representation of access history for the given role, and MAC (Bell & La Padula,
1976) to implement multi-level security for the protected data were used to regulate access
to sensitive data resources. Successful trust negotiation results in a set of new credentials
that are passed back to the requestor, who adds those credentials to their personal trust
profile and can be utilized in future attempts at trust negotiation. The main objectives have
been four-fold: 1. define a set of Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among
Organizations Participating in Trust Negotiation that allows healthcare organizations to
trust in credentials issued by each other, even in the event the healthcare organizations do
not personally know each other; 2. define an Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording
Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data to document a user’s sensitive EHR
access as a method of building trust with unknown healthcare organizations; 3. define
Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies to map trust profile credentials
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to ABAC, RBAC, and MAC; and, 4. define a Trust Negotiation Development Framework
that incorporates these contributions into the FHIR standard and our implementation of the
CT2 app.
The remainder of this conclusion is organized into 3 sections. Section 7.1
summarizes this dissertation while highlighting the four main objectives detailed above.
Section 7.2 builds on this by discussing the four research contributions of this dissertation:
Contribution A: Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations
Participating in Trust Negotiation; Contribution B: Integrated Trust Profile Model for
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data; Contribution C:
Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies; and, Contribution D: Trust
Negotiation Development Framework. In Section 7.3, we discuss ongoing research and
identify future directions for trust profile based trust negotiation including but not limited
to: framework extensions that streamline the trust negotiation process, demonstration of
our approach in other domains, further integration of the trust negotiation framework with
FHIR, improvements to the trust profile requirements specification, framework
deployment improvements, and a formal security evaluation of trust profile based trust
negotiation.

7.1.

Summary
The research presented in this dissertation works to create a trust profile based on

a user’s access history to sensitive data resources as a new means of obtaining authorization
to similar sensitive data resources, without the need for the user or the remote controller to
have a pre-existing relationship. The main focus of the dissertation was to create an
automated process where a user’s history of access to sensitive data resources allows a
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remote controller to infer trustworthiness in handling future sensitive data resources by:
generating a series of trust profile requirements for the user, communicating the
requirements to the user, negotiating the release of trust profile credentials that fulfill the
requirements, matching the presented credentials to the requirements, and generating new
credentials when the requirements are fulfilled. The discussion of this process was
presented throughout six chapters.
Chapter 1 introduced the main research areas and provided a high level overview
for enhancement of existing authorization models with trust negotiation and trust profiles.
Section 1.1 discussed the motivation for trust profiles and trust negotiation from a
healthcare perspective, describing the state of healthcare security and the issues within
healthcare that demand new forms of dynamic authorization to sensitive healthcare data.
Section 1.2 discussed the motiviation for trust profiles and the potential applications of
trust profiling to enable dynamic authorization between two arbitrary parties with no preexisting relationship. Section 1.3 explained a high level overview of our approach to
integrate trust profiles and trust negotiation into an authorization solution. Section 1.4
provided a listing of the research objectives and the expected contributions of this
dissertation. Section 1.5 discussed the published works written in support of the research
discussed in this dissertation. Section 1.6 concludes the chapter with an outline concerning
the structure of the remainder of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 provided necessary background on concepts utilized in the construction
of our approach to creating a trust profile based trust negotiation authorization framework
throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Section 2.1 discussed the current state of trust
and interoperability support between healthcare organizations in support of our later
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integration of trust profiles and trust negotiation into the healthcare setting. Section 2.2
described access control models commonly utilized in current authorization techniques and
the manner in which we integrate them into our work. Section 2.3 provided an overview of
the Fast Healthcare Interoperabilty Resources (FHIR) standard and the HAPI FHIR Java
implementation of the standard in support of the proof of concept prototype discussed in
Chapter 6. Section 2.4 discussed the Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT 2) app, a
collaboration between the Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer
Science & Engineering at the University of Connecticut and the Schools of Nursing and
Medicine, which provided a testbed for our prototype in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3 presented the infrastructure requirements for trust negotiation that create
a network of trust between systems participating in trust negotiation via a set of identity
and attribute certificates that encode trust profile data. Section 3.1 began the chapter with
a discussion of identity and attribute certificates, their formats, and their useage defined in
the X.509 standard. Section 3.2 gave background on the basic trust negotiation process,
including: credential exchange, certificate validation, and credential expression generation;
and, provides an example of trust negotiation from a healthcare perspective. Section 3.3
introduced the trust profile certificate infrastructure that allows trust profile credentials
encoded in the identity and attribute certificates to be shared and trusted among all systems
participating in trust negotiation. Section 3.4 described the structure of a controller that
receives trust negotiation requests, generates requirements for the user’s presented trust
profile, guards access to sensitive healthcare data, and generates new trust profile
credentials on a successful trust negotiation attempt.
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Chapter 4 presented a detailed description of a formal model for trust profiles and
integration of trust profiles with adaptive trust negotiation. Section 4.1 introduces the trust
profile concept and combines it with the identity and attribute certificate concepts
introduced in Section 3.1, as well as introducing the new trust profile credential generation
process. Section 4.2 introduces a detailed model and definitions for trust profile structure
and controller interaction, including definitions for: the user, controller, and resources; the
encoding of entries in the trust profile’s X.509 identity and attribute certificates; and, the
trust negotiation interactions between the users and controllers during the trust negotiation
process. Section 4.3 ties together the trust profile definitions by providing a detailed
example utilizing the healthcare field that describes the interactions between the user and
controller, the process of utilizing the trust profile to obtain access to sensitive resources,
and obtaining new trust profile credentials. Section 4.4 describes related work to trust
negotiation and compares it to our new implementation.
Chapter 5 introduced the trust negotiation development framework by providing: a
controller infrastructure for applying security metadata to resources at multiple levels, a
method for defining trust profile requirements, and a method for combining the multi-level
security metadata into an access control decision. Section 5.1 explained the Sec object
concept that parses a configuration for its level, matches incoming trust profile credentials
to the security requirements the configuration represents, and decides whether the
presented trust profile credentials are sufficient to allow access to its level of security.
Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4 introduced the four types of Sec objects and the security levels: the
system level that protects all resources of a system, the resource type level that protects all
resources of a certain type, the resource level that protects an individual resource, and the
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consent level that allows the data’s owner to set security requirements on the data. Section
5.1.5 provided a method for combining the requirements of the four types of Sec objects to
decide whether access to the requested resource is allowed. Section 5.2 detailed the JSON
schema of a configuration and provided example configurations for the four types of Sec
objects.
Chapter 6 discussed the prototype trust profile supporting trust negotiation
framework incorporated into the existing Connecticut Concussion Tracker CT 2 app.
Section 6.1 discussed the modifications made to the CT 2 app to support authorization to
concussion data via trust profile based trust negotiation and pictured the app with
concussion data and the additional screens that support trust negotiation. Section 6.2
showed the Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager that manages the manual creation of
certificates for certificate authorities and a user’s initial trust profile certificates. Section
6.3 detailed the Trust Negotiation Controller that: provides the communication point for
trust negotiation between the CT2 app and the concussion data, validates certificates,
provides the Sec object creation and credential matching capabilities, decides whether
access to the data is allowed, and generates new trust profile certificates and retrieves the
requested data on a successful trust negotiation attempt.

7.2.

Research Contributions
This section revisits the expected research contributions presented in Section 1.4 of

Chapter 1 and describes how each was attained throughout the chapters of this dissertation.
The trust profile based trust negotiation infrastructure and framework has the following
contributions:
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A. Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations
Participating in Trust Negotiation: This contribution specified a structure
for disseminating trust among the trust negotiation participants, displayed
in the left side of Figure 1.1 of Chapter 1 and represented by the Trust
Building process in Figure 1.2 of Chapter 1. This contribution allows trust
in the trust profile certificates to be established through the given
application of the X.509 standard, allowing the utilization of a decentralized
network structure, increasing fault tolerance and efficiency. Chapter 3
supports this contribution by providing a network structure (shown in
Figure 3.3), controller structure (shown in Figure 3.4), and providing a
detailed description of the trust profile certificate infrastructure (Section
3.3).
B. Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording Complete Records of
User Access to Sensitive Data: This contribution presented a formal model
for the completion of a trust negotiation process utilizing trust profile
credentials, displayed in the Trust Negotiation level of Figure 1.2 and
represented in Figure 1.1 by the Identity Certificates, Attribute Certificates,
and Trust Profile on the left side and the process of exchange between the
User Trust Agent and the Controller Trust Agent. Chapters 3 and 4
supported this contribution. Chapter 3 supported this contribution through
an overview of the trust negotiation process and description of the controller
structure. Chapter 4 supported this contribution by providing formal
defninitions for the participants in trust profile based trust negotiation
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(Defns. 1-3 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4), the structure of trust profiles
(Defns. 8-15 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4), and the interactions of the
requestor and controller (Defns. 4-7, 16-21 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4).
This allowed the creation of a trust profile and methods for negotiating the
release of sensitive data.
C. Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies: This
contribution incorporates access control models into the trust negotiation
process by allowing the requested resources to be annotated with security
metadata and allowing the controller to utilize that security metadata to
make a decision regarding access, represented in Figure 1.2 by the Security
Policies level and the Access Control Policies on the right side of Figure
1.1. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 supported this contribution by defining the
integration of access control policies into attribute certificates, the trust
profile, and the controller respectively. Chapter 6 supported this
contribution by describing a controller implementation that supports the
dynamic access control policies. This contribution allows the integration of
common access control models into trust negotiation.
D. Trust Negotiation Development Framework: This contribution defines a
process for combining Contributions A, B, and C into a coherent whole that
provides a unified framework capable of performing trust based trust
negotiation. Chapters 5 and 6 supported this contribution by creating a
controller definition that dynamically generates access control policies and
by detailing a prototype implementation of the research presented in this
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dissertation. This contribution allows the easy deployment of a trust
negotiation network that incorporates trust profiles as credentials.

7.3.

Ongoing and Future Work
This dissertation presents research that has potential for future improvements and

extensions to our work on adaptive trust negotiation. A list of ongoing and future topics
includes: an extension to the framework in order to model batch processing of resource
requests and the ability to delegate trust profile credentials; demonstrating the adaptive,
trust profile based trust negotiation framework in other domains; exploring the integration
of the trust negotiation framework concepts directly into FHIR resources by leveraging the
profile extension; improving communication of requirements and dissemination of
credentials through the improvement of the configuration specification, SGPs, and
providing automatic fulfillment of the provided SGP by the requestor’s trust agent;
improving the trust negotiation framework’s deployment by streamlining the trust
negotiation framework’s setup through standardized trust profile credential storage and
docker container deployment; and, performing a formal security evaluation of the
presented trust profile based trust negotiation framework.
Framework Extensions: The framework currently does not efficiently handle
transactions that require the retrieval of multiple resources in a batch format. This is
apparent for students that may have multiple concussion records in the prototype, or if trust
negotiation is enabled, to retrieve the initial listing of students as under FHIR each student
would be listed in a separate Patient resource returned as a bundle. Future work could result
in a defined method for resolving a trust negotiation attempt for multiple resources of
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differing types in one transaction. Delegation of trust profile entries is another feature that
could be added to the framework to enable secure delegation of trust profile credentials,
which would allow others to assist in the requesting of sensitive data (e.g., an assistant
retrieving healthcare records a physician will need for an appointment). Future work could
implement this by creating a method for temporary delegation of a subset of a user’s trust
profile to another user, allowing a user to securely obtain access to data on behalf of
another.
Demonstration of Trust Profiles, Sec Objects, and Controllers in Other
Domains: Trust negotiation and trust profiles have applications to domains other than
healthcare where a dynamic coalition of multiple specialists have an unforseen need to
share secure data. The dynamic sharing of sensitive criminal investigation data among
multiple jurisdictions in the legal community could lead to increased cooperation among
law enforcement and increased arrests when crimes are committed in multiple jurisdictions.
The financial industry is also an applicable domain, as shown by an online purchase trust
negotiation implementation (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, & Seamons, 2005) that
utilizes transaction history. The future work considers a methodology for the adaptation of
trust profiles and trust negotiations to any domain.
Integration of Trust Negotiation Framework with FHIR: The Sec object
configurations in the prototype are hosted in a separate database instance and are retrieved
through concussion identifiers by the controller when the request is first received. The
profile extension is a potential method for embedding a resource’s requirements directly
into the resource itself. The resources would be able to retrieve multiple Sec objects in one
request since the resources know their system, resource type, and their patient. This would
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also allow easy updating of the Sec objects and through the FHIR interface. Additionally,
the Security Labels through extensions are another resource provided by FHIR that allows
the embedding of access control data, which has the potential to provide additional security
data and the potential enhancement of the Release Actions.
Communication of Requirements: While versatile and expressive, the current
configuration schema for representing Sec object requirements could be improved to
reduce redundancy when multiple AHP property sets share similar but not completely
overlapping requirements. The improvement could take the form of a property set specified
in the properties array itself behaving as a tree where the nodes closer to the roots represent
common requirements among its subbranches, and their children represent unique
divergences in the trust profile requirements relative to their parents. Additionally, the SGP
requirements could be streamlined in the same manner and described to the user in a more
intuitive display than the example provided in Chapter 6 in Figure 6.4, where the SGP
JSON is printed directly to the screen. Finally, since a trust profile can grow arbitrarily
large over the course of a user’s entire career, the app could automatically retrieve the
proper credentials to fulfill the SGP, only asking the user for confirmation before sending
the credentials back to the controller.
Trust Negotiation Framework Deployment Improvements: The deployment of
the Trust Negotiation Framework could be improved by making a configurable docker
container available that can be run as an easy method for adding trust negotiation to a server
housing sensitive data. Through proper docker configuration, a new trust negotiation URL
could be implemented that can be connected to through a RESTful API, where the
controller is configured to have access to the underlying sensitive data. Additionally, the
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trust profile deployment to mobile devices could be improved by properly handling cases
where multiple people may need to share the same device, such as in a healthcare setting
where separate, security hardened devices may be shared among healthcare employees. In
this case, it must be easy for the user to retrieve and use the private keys of their own trust
profile, while making it impossible for a user to access the private keys of another user’s
trust profile.
Formal Security Evaluation: The current implementation of trust profile based
trust negotiation lacks a formal security evaluation of its parts and operation that is capable
of providing a list of guarantees regarding the usage of trust profiles in both successful and
unsuccessful situations. Performing a formal security evaluation of the presented trust
profile based trust negotiation framework, as well as the presented CT 2 app prototype,
would offer data on possible vulnerabilities that could occur in a potential full deployment
of a trust profile based trust negotiation implementation over a large network. This
information is useful to medical authorities, whose expertise is necessary to build trust
among all of the participants in a healthcare-focused trust negotiation scheme.

140

References
Alhaqbani, B., & C., F. (2008). Access Control Requirements for Processing Electronic Health
Records. In A. ter Hofstede, B. Benatallah, & H.-Y. Paik, Business Process Management
Workshops (pp. 371-382). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelber.
Bell, D. E., & La Padula, L. J. (1976). Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and Multics
Interpretation. Bedford, Mass.: MITRE Corp.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2018, 9 24). Introduction | Meaningful Use | CDC.
Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/ehrmeaningfuluse/introduction.html
Cisco. (2020, March 9). Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018-2023. Retrieved May 20, 2020, from
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/executive-perspectives/annualinternet-report/white-paper-c11-741490.html
Connecticut General Assembly. (2015). Substitute for Raised H.B. No. 6722. Retrieved from
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&which_year
=2015&bill_num=6722
Cooper, et al. (2008, May). Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate. Retrieved from
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Agresta, T., & Yasnoff, W. (January-June 2019). Multi-Level Security
in Healthcare using a Lattice-Based Access Control Model. IGI International Journal of
Privacy and Health Information Management (IJPHIM), 7(1), 80-102.
Elkhodr, M., Shahrestani, S., & Cheung, H. (2011). Enhancing the security of mobile health
monitoring systems through trust negotiations. Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2011
IEEE 36th Converence on (pp. 754-757). Bonn: IEEE.
Epic Systems Corporation. (2020, January 4). Epic. Retrieved from https://www.epic.com/
Facebook. (2020). Facebook Login. Retrieved May 21,
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/web/

2020,

from

Facebook:

Farrell, S et al. (2010, January). An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization.
Retrieved July 5, 2020, from The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF®):
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5755
Farrell, S., & Housley, R. (2002, April). An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization.
Retrieved
from
The
Internet
Engineering
Task
Force
(IETF®):
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt
Fernández-Alemán, J., Señor, I., Lozoya, P., & Toval, A. (2013). Security and privacy in electronic
health records: A systematic literature review. J Biomed. Inform, 46(3), 541-562.
141

Ferraiolo, D. F., Sandhu, R., Gavrila, S., Kuhn, D. R., & Chandramou, R. (2001). Proposed NIST
standard for role-based access control. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), 4(3), 224–274.
Gartner. (March 19, 2015). Gartner Says Global Devices Shipments to Grow 2.8 Percent in 2015.
Egham, UK: Gartner. Retrieved from http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3010017
Google. (2020, May 20). Using OAuth 2.0 to Access Google APIs. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from
Google Identity Platform: https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2
HAPI FHIR. (2020). HAPI FHIR - The Open Source FHIR API for Java. Retrieved January 10,
2020, from https://hapifhir.io/
Hardt, D. (2012, October). The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework. Retrieved from Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF): https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
HealthIT.gov. (2014, May 12). What is HIE? Retrieved from HealthIT:
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/health-information-exchange/what-hie
HL7 International. (2013, 08 01). Value Sets using code system: Confidentiality. Retrieved June
27,
2020,
from
HL7
International:
http://www.hl7.org/documentcenter/public/standards/vocabulary/vocabulary_tables/infras
tructure/vocabulary/vs_Confidentiality.html
HL7 International. (2019, January 4). Health Level Seven International. Retrieved from
https://www.hl7.org/
HL7 International. (2019, November 1). Resourcelist - FHIR v4.0.1. Retrieved January 19, 2020,
from https://www.hl7.org/fhir/resourcelist.html
HL7 International. (2019, November 1). Resourcelist - FHIR v4.0.1. Retrieved January 19, 2020,
from https://www.hl7.org/fhir/resourcelist.html
HL7 International. (2019, 3 27). Security - FHIR v4.0.0. Retrieved from FHIR:
https://www.hl7.org/fhir/security.html#binding
HL7 International. (2019). USCore. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from HL7 International:
https://www.hl7.org/fhir/us/core/ValueSet-us-core-careteam-provider-roles.html
HL7

International. (2020, May 9). Overview.
https://www.hl7.org/fhir/overview.html

Retrieved

from

HL7

FHIR:

Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., & Solo, D. (2002, April). Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. Retrieved from The Internet Engineering Task
Force: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt

142

Hu, V. C., Ferraiolo, D., Kuhn, R., Schnitzer, A., Sandlin, K., Miller, R., & Scarfone, K. (2014).
Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations. NIST
Special Publication. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-162
Identity Theft Resource Center. (2020). 2019 End of Year Data Breach Report. Retrieved May 20,
2020,
from
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020_ITRC_2019-End-of-Year-Data-BreachReport_FINAL_Highres-Appendix.pdf
Kelly, V. (2013, Dec.). Global Healthcare Stakeholders Want Standards-Based Interoperability
and Communications, According to IEEE. Retrieved from IEEE Standards Association:
https://standards.ieee.org/news/2013/ieeesa_mhealth-summit.html
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. (2013). Retrieved July 5, 2020, from The Legion of the Bouncy
Castle: https://www.bouncycastle.org/
Lewis, N. (2011, 10 21). 80% Of Doctors Use Mobile Devices At Work. Retrieved May 9, 2020,
from Information Week: https://www.informationweek.com/mobile/80--of-doctors-usemobile-devices-at-work/d/d-id/1100880?
Mavridis, I., Georgiadis, C., Pangalos, G., & Khair, M. (2001, Jan-Mar). Access Control based on
Attribute Certificates for Medical Intranet Applications. Journal of Medical Internet
Research, 3(1).
Mettler, T., & Rohner, P. (2009). Increasing the Networkability of Health Service Providers: The
Case of Switzerland. Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 9(1).
Montopoli, B. (2013, August 7). For criminals, smartphones becoming prime targets. (CBS News)
Retrieved 10 30, 2016, from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-criminals-smartphonesbecoming-prime-targets/
NUCC. (2020). Provider Taxonomy. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from National Uniform Claim
Committee: http://www.nucc.org/index.php/code-sets-mainmenu-41/provider-taxonomymainmenu-40
OpenEMR. (2020, May 21). OpenEMR. Retrieved from OpenEMR: https://www.open-emr.org/
OpenSSL Software Foundation. (2018). index. Retrieved from OpenSSL Cryptography and
SSL/TLS Toolkit: https://www.openssl.org/
Oracle.

(2013).
What
is
a
servlet?
https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/bnafe.html

Retrieved

from

Rivera Sánchez, Y. (2017). A Configurable Framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Mobile
Applications.
Storrs:
Doctoral
Dissertations.
Retrieved
from
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1572/
143

Rivera Sánchez, Y. (2017). A Configurable Framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Mobile
Applications. Storrs.
Ryutov, T., Zhou, L., Neuman, C., Leithead, T., & Seamons, K. (2005). Adaptive Trust
Negotiation and Access Control. SACMAT '05 Proceedings of the tenth ACM symposium
on Access control models and technologies (pp. 139-146). New York City: ACM New
York, NY, USA ©2005.
Sanzi et al. (2017). Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust Negotiation, and Attribute Based Access
Control. 2017 5th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services,
and Engineering (MobileCloud) (pp. 177-184). San Francisco: IEEE.
doi:10.1109/MobileCloud.2017.30
Sanzi, E., & Demurjian, S. (May 2016). Identification and Adaptive Trust Negotiation in
Interconnected Systems. In A. Malik, A. Anjum, & B. Raza (Eds.), Innovative Solutions
for Access Control Management (pp. 33-65). IGI Global.
Sanzi, E., Demurjian, S., & Billings, J. (2017). Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust Negotiation, and
Attribute Based Access Control. 2017 5th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Cloud
Computing, Services, and Engineering (MobileCloud) (pp. 177-184). San Francisco: IEEE.
doi:10.1109/MobileCloud.2017.30
Sanzi, E., Demurjian, S., Agresta, T., & Murphy, A. (November 2016). Trust Profiling to Enable
Adaptive Trust Negotiation in Mobile Devices. In S. Mukherja (Ed.), Mobile Application
Development, Usability, and Security (pp. 95-116). IGI Global.
SNOMED International. (2020). SNOMED. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from 5-Step Briefing:
https://www.snomed.org/snomed-ct/five-step-briefing
Sundelin, T. L. (July 2003). Surrogate Trust Negotiation: Solving Authentication and
Authorization Issues in Dynamic Mobile Networks. Bringham Young University.
The Apache Software Foundation. (2018). Welcome to the Apache Struts project. Retrieved July
5, 2020, from Struts: https://struts.apache.org/index.html
The Apache Software Foundation. (2020). Welcome! Retrieved July 5, 2020, from Apache
Tomcat: http://tomcat.apache.org/
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. (2018, September 19).
Meaningful Consent Overview | HealthIT.gov. Retrieved January 24, 2020, from
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/meaningful-consent-overview
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. (2019, April 17).
Patient Consent for Electronic Health Information Exchange | HealthIT.gov. Retrieved
January 24, 2020, from https://www.healthit.gov/topic/patient-consent-electronic-healthinformation-exchange
144

Twitter, Inc. (2020). Twitter Developers. Retrieved May 21,
https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/basics/authentication/overview

2020,

from

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. (2019, 01 04). Health Information Privacy.
Retrieved 05 9, 2020, from hhs.gov: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/index.html
Vawdrey, D. K., Sundelin, T. L., Seamons, K. E., & Knutson, C. D. (2003). Trust Negotiation for
Authentication and Authorization in Healthcare Information Systems. Engineering in
Medicine and Biology Society, 2003. Proceedings of the 25th Annual International
Conference of the IEEE (pp. 1406-1409). IEEE.
Ventola, C. L. (2014, May). Mobile Devices and Apps for Health Care Professionals: Uses and
Benefits. Pharmacy and Therapeutics, 39(5), 356-364. Retrieved from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4029126
W3C. (2007). SOAP Specifications. Retrieved from https://www.w3.org/TR/soap/
Winsborough, W. H., Seamons, K. E., & Jones, V. E. (2000). Automated trust negotiation. DARPA
Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 2000. DISCEX '00. Proceedings. 1,
pp. 88 - 102. Hilton Head, SC: IEEE. doi:10.1109/DISCEX.2000.824965
WorldVistA. (2020, May 21). Retrieved from WorldVistA: http://worldvista.org/
Yale New Haven Health; Yale Medical Group. (2020, May 21). FAQ Care Everywhere. Retrieved
from
YaleNewHavenHealth:
https://projectepic.ynhh.org/Epic%20Newsletters%20and%20Fact%20Sheets/FAQ%20C
are%20Everywhere.pdf

145

